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The aim of this dissertation is to answer three real life economic questions with the
following three chapters.
Chapter 1, (joint with Matteo Bobba), deals with the problems of weak instruments
in identifying the eﬀects of education on democracy. This chapter shows that when
the problems caused by weak instruments are properly considered Education aﬀects
Democracy.
Chapter 2, (joint with Mario Mariniello), analyzes both theoretically and empirically
what are the eﬀects of potential competition on actual competition in public procurement
auctions in Italy. A model of endogenous entry in auctions is adapted to inspect the
theoretical problem and a regression discontinuity design is exploited to identify the
causal eﬀects of advertisement on entry and competition in this market.
Chapter 3, (joint with Stefano Gagliarducci), explores the relationship between politics
and the functioning of public procurements auctions in Italy. In particular, we use the
introduction of the two-limit law in 1993 to identify the causal eﬀect of political longevity
in oﬃce, longer tenure of the mayors, on several outcomes of the auctions. The channel
of discretional renegotiations appear to be the tools to distribute political favors which
building entry barrier limits competition at the auction level.
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Weak instruments and weak
identiﬁcation,
in estimating the eﬀects of
education, on democracy
Synopsis
Is there any relation between education and democracy? Once we correct
for weak instruments and identify education as weakly exogenous we ﬁnd new
evidence that education systematically predicts democracy. Our results are
robust across model speciﬁcation, instrumentation strategies, and samples.
1.1 Introduction
The relationship between education and democracy has been at the heart of both aca-
demic and political debate of the last decade. Recent empirical work has reached mixed
results. Glaeser et al. (2004), using OLS, present evidence that countries level of edu-
cation predict changes in democracy. Nonetheless, Acemoglu et al. (2005) demonstrate
the fragility of those results. Both analysis consider past levels of education exogenous to
countries levels of democracy. In this paper we argue that (1) given the forward-looking
nature of investments in human capital, education is endogenous and thus its eﬀects on
democracy are weakly identiﬁed and (2) given the high persistence in democracy and
education, the ﬁndings of Acemoglu et al. (2005) are subject to weak identiﬁcation and
weak instruments problems. Indeed, we show that (lagged) levels of education systemat-
ically predict changes in democracy by considering a diﬀerent identiﬁcation assumption
(weak exogeneity) for education and by using additional and more informative moment
conditions to instrument all the regressors.
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1.2 Identiﬁcation assumptions
We consider the following dynamic speciﬁcation to disentangle the relationship between
democracy and education:
dit = αdit−1 + γsit−1 + βXit−1 + ηi + δt + eit (1.1)
where dit is the democracy (level) of country i in period t, sit−1 is the lagged value of
average years of schooling, Xit−1 is a vector of (non-contemporaneous) control variables,
and ηi and δt denote a full set of country eﬀects and time eﬀects. In order to assess the
eﬀects of education on democracy, Acemoglu et al. (2005) estimate Eq. (1.1) in ﬁrst
diﬀerences and employ lagged levels of the regressors as instruments for the equation in
ﬁrst diﬀerences.1 The so-called “Diﬀerence” GMM estimator relies upon the following
orthogonality conditions:
E[dit−s∆ǫi,t] = 0 (1.2)
for t = 3,....,T and s ≥ 2, where dit−s represents the instruments set used in this
GMM estimator. In this setting, it is well known that the higher the persistence of
the series used as instruments, the lower the correlation between levels and subsequent
diﬀerences.2
It is widely recognized that both democracy and education are highly persistent3, there-
fore lagged levels are weak instruments for the diﬀerences and it is possible to gain
precision in terms of point estimates bias by exploiting some additional moment restric-
tions.4
The so-called System GMM estimator stacks together the equation in ﬁrst diﬀerences
and the equation in levels in a system of equations and employs both lagged levels and
diﬀerences as internal instruments. In order to consider the additional moments as valid
instruments for Eq. (1.1), the following additional linear moment conditions must be
1The ﬁrst diﬀerences are a standard way to deal with country eﬀects; see Arellano and Bond (1991).
2Simulation results show that the Diﬀerence GMM may be subject to a large downward ﬁnite-
sample bias in this case, particularly when T is small. This weak instrument argument can be seen
by considering the following transformation of a simple AR(1) process ∆dit = (α − 1)dit−1 + eit. The
higher the persistence of α, the lower E(∆ditdit−1). See Blundell and Bond (1998).
3Our preferred estimates of the univariate AR(1) processes deliver estimates of the autoregressive
coeﬃcient for Democracy and Education that are respectively 0.66 and 0.93, thus both very persistent;
see Blundell and Bond (1998). Those results are not presented because of space limitations but are
available on request.
4See Blundell and Bond (1998) for simulation results.
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satisﬁed:
E[∆dit−s(ηi + ǫit)] = 0 (1.3)
for t = 4,5...,T and s ≥ 2.
Condition (1.3) implies that changes in democracy are orthogonal to the country ﬁxed
eﬀect. We test the validity of this assumption. Our identiﬁcation strategy diﬀers from
previous empirical work where past education has always been assumed to be exoge-
nous. We consider this assumption to be strong since education can be viewed as a
forward-looking variable: people take into account the expected future level of political
development when investing in human capital. With internal instruments we can control
for a weak form of exogeneity in education (and in other covariates) only by assuming
that our explanatory variables can be aﬀected by current and past realizations of democ-
racy but must be uncorrelated with future unpredictable innovations in democracy (the
error term). The dataset employed in our analysis is the same used by Acemoglu et al.
(2005).5
1.3 Results
In a multivariate panel data framework it is not clear how to test for weak instruments,
hence we use the known bias in the Diﬀerence GMM by comparing its sample perfor-
mances with alternative estimators with known properties in dynamic panel data and
test whether our preferred estimator, the System GMM, improves the precision of the
estimates.7 Table 1 reports the main results of estimation of model (1) across various
estimators using the baseline sample 19652000. Column 1 and 2 show the results of
Within Groups and Pooled OLS estimators that provide, respectively, the lower and
upper bound for the autoregressive coeﬃcient of democracy.8 Columns 3 and 4 employ
alternatively one and two step Diﬀerence GMM estimators9; the estimated autoregres-
sive coeﬃcient is smaller than or equal to the corresponding Within Groups estimate,
which should be the lower bound in a short panel like this one. We then conclude that
this estimator is likely to be seriously downward biased, and the consequent ﬁnding that
education is not statistically diﬀerent from zero (and sometimes negative) under both
speciﬁcations is not instructive. Columns 5 and 6 report the System GMM estimates,
one and two step, respectively, and the results are striking: the estimated autoregressive
coeﬃcient lies between the two bounds, and the lagged level of education now has a pos-
5Because of space restrictions we do not describe them here and refer the reader to the original paper.
Our dataset is a ﬁve-year panel with 108 countries spanning the period between 1965 and 2000.
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itive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on democracy at the 1-percent signiﬁcance level. The point
estimate is 0.099, implying that an additional year of schooling increases the steady-state
value of democracy by 18 percentages points.10 To address the validity of the additional
moment conditions (3) we run an incremental Sargan test for over-identiﬁcation restric-
tion based on the diﬀerence in the Sargan tests between the System and Diﬀerence
estimator.11 The corresponding Chi-square statistic does not reject the null of validity
of condition (3). A possible concern with this last result is that it may be driven by the
presence in our sample of industrial countries in which the level of democracy is very
high and persistent across our time span, hence the change in democracy is zero for these
countries and condition (3) holds trivially. In columns 7 and 8 we exclude industrial
countries from the base sample and estimation results conﬁrm both the validity of con-
dition (3) and the positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect of education on subsequent democracy.
Note that the estimated coeﬃcient of education might include both direct and indirect
eﬀect of education on democracy working through income (or other possible channels);
this motivates us to perform various robustness checks of our results by adding standard
covariates, as per capita GDP (in logs), investments and population (in logs).12 Table
2 presents these additional results. Columns 1 to 3 add each covariate and show that
none of these variables is signiﬁcant, while our variable of interest, education, remains
signiﬁcant at the 1-percent level, which is not true for GDP. In order to disentangle the
eﬀect of education on democracy, in Column 4 we consider all three covariates simulta-
neously and ﬁnd that the estimated coeﬃcient of education remains highly signiﬁcant,
with a point estimate slightly lower (0.029) than the baseline case of Table 1. We in-
terpret this result as evidence of the primacy of the direct eﬀect of human capital on
political institutions and supportive of the interpretation that the indirect eﬀect working
from income to democracy is negligible once we take human capital into account. In
order to further stress this argument, we run a regression of the ﬁve-year change of our
democracy index on past levels of education and three standard covariates. The results
are reported in column 5 and are entirely consistent with the ﬁndings of Glaeser et al.
(2004), but they are now robust to weak instruments and to considering education as
weakly exogenous.6 Levels of schooling appear to be a strong predictor of improving
institutional outcomes, while per capita income has no predictive power.7
6See in particular Glaeser et al. (2004), Table 12, panel B.
7Due to space limitations we omit comments on all the Sargan tests and AR (1) and AR(2) speciﬁ-
cation tests which in Table 2 conﬁrm the correct speciﬁcation of all the estimated models considered.
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1.4 Conclusions
We have revisited the nature of the relationship between political institutions and in-
vestment in human capital by taking into account two sources of bias: weak instruments
and endogeneity. Using an alternative estimator, a diﬀerent identiﬁcation assumption,
and diﬀerent sub-samples we have found evidence of a statistically signiﬁcant relation-
ship between past levels of education and levels and changes of democracy.
1.5 Tables



















































Table 1.1: Bounding procedure: Results for baseline model across various estimators
Dependent variables: Within Pooled Diﬀ-1 Diﬀ-2 Sys-1 Sys-2 Sys-1 Sys-2
democracy (t) group OLS GMM GMM GMM GMM NO-OECD NO-OECD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Democracy (t-1) 0.387 0.703 0.319 0.399 0.450 0.506 0.422 0.484
(-7.05) (-19.51) (-2.06) (-2.37) (-4.52) (-5.1) (-4.12) (-4.67)
Education (t-1) -0.005 0.027 -0.066 -0.024 0.099 0.062 0.128 0.10
(-0.25) (7.17) (-0.66) (-0.28) (3.40) (2.43) (3.16) (2.54)
Constant 0.366 0.061 -0.009 0.076 -0.155 -0.108
(5.56) (3.04) (-0.14) (1.62) (-1.83) (-1.47)
Time eﬀect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hansen 0.49 0.49 0.29 0.29 0.50 0.50
Diﬀ Hansen 0.19 0.19 0.33 0.33
A R(1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
A R (2) 0.69 0.92 0.73 0.73 0.80 0.76
Obs. 775 775 667 667 775 775 601 601
N 108 108 104 104 108 108 86 86
Note: Dependent variables is the Augmented Freedom House Political Rights Index. Diﬀ-1 GMM and Diﬀ-2 GMM are the one (two) step diﬀer-
ence GMM estimation. SYS-1 (-2) GMM are the one (two) step system GMM estimation. Robust standard error are computed for the t-tests
reported in (). For one step estimates are computed HuberWhite standard errors, while the two step estimates are Windmeijer corrected. The
values reported for the Hansen test are the p-values for the null hypothesis of instrument validity. The Diﬀ Hansen reports the p-value for the
validity of the additional moment restrictions required by the SYS GMM. The values reported for A R (1) and A R (2) are the p-values for ﬁrst
and second order auto correlated disturbances in the ﬁrst diﬀerences equations. Five-year panel, between 19652000, as in Acemoglu et al. (2005).
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Table 1.2: Robustness checks, additional covariates
Dependent variables: Sys-2 Sys-2 Sys-2 Sys-2 Sys-2
democracy (t) GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Democracy (t-1) 0.562 0.554 0.572 0.556 -0.444
(8.10) (7.68) (6.98) (8.43) (6.74)
Education (t-1) 0.025 0.05 0.043 0.029 0.029
(1.42) (5.31) (3.37) (2.29) (2.29)
Ln (rgdpch) (t-1) 0.042 0.035 0.035
(1.16) (0.95) (0.95)
Ln (pop) (t-1) -0.032 -0.013 -0.013
(-1.33) (-0.92) (-0.92)
Ln (ki) (t-1) -0.047 0.154 0.154
(-0.21) (0.79) (0.79)
Constant -0.156 0.37. 0.022 -0.118 -0.118
(-0.65) (1.75) (0.43) (-0.41) (-0.41)
Time eﬀect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hansen 0.27 0.25 0.36 0.99 0.99
Diﬀ Hansen 0.39 0.52 0.8 0.99 0.99
AR(1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AR(2) 0.81 0.75 0.86 0.84 0.84
Obs. 692 763 696 685 685
N 97 106 97 96 96
Note: Dependent variables is the Augmented Freedom House Political Rights Index. SYS-2
GMM are the two step system GMM estimates. Windmeijer corrected standard error are
computed for the t-tests reported in (). The values reported for the Hansen test are the p-values
for the null hypothesis of instrument validity. The Diﬀ Hansen reports the p-value for the
validity of the additional moment restrictions required by the SYS GMM. The values reported
for AR(1) and AR(2) are the p-values for ﬁrst and second order autocorrelated disturbances in
the ﬁrst diﬀerences equations. Five-year panel, between 19652000, as in Acemoglu et al. (2005).






Evidence from Discontinuities in
Public Procurement Auctions
Synopsis
Calls for tenders are the natural devices to inform bidders, thus to en-
large the pool of potential participants. We exploit discontinuities generated
by the Italian Law on tender’s publicity to identify the eﬀect of enlarging the
pool of potential participants on competition in public procurement auctions.
We show that most of the eﬀects of publicity are at regional and European
level. Increasing tenders’ publicity from local to regional determines an in-
crease in the number of bidders by 50% and an extra reduction of 5% in the
price paid by the contracting authority; increasing publicity from national to
European has no eﬀect on the number of bidders but it determines an extra
reduction of 10% in the price paid by the contracting authority. No eﬀect
is observed when publicity is increased from regional to national. Finally,
we relate measures of competition to ex-post duration of the works ﬁnding
a negative correlation between duration and the number of bidders or the
winning rebate.
2.1 Introduction
Public procurement contracts in Member States amount to a huge slice of the Euro-
pean Union’s GDP: 16 % in 2002. Only 16.2 % of the Union’s public procurement is
published in the European Oﬃcial Journal, though.1 Member States and the European
1European Commission, 2004.
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Commission are pushing to increase the use of advertising policies by the contracting
authorities considering it as the natural device to improve the performance of public
procurement markets. For instance, Directive 2004/18/CE stresses the importance of
an extensive use of advertising in order to foster the participation of European ﬁrms in
tenders taking place within the European Market. Surprisingly, however, no consensus
in the theoretical and empirical literature exists on the eﬀects of increasing the pool of
potential participants on the outcome of public procurement auctions.
In this paper we use regression discontinuity methods (Angrist and Lavy, 1999;
Hahn,Todd and van der Klaauw, 2001) to test for the eﬀects of enlarging the pool of
potential participants (i.e. of advertising a tender) on the level and nature of compe-
tition in public procurement auctions in Italy. Furthermore, we report evidence of the
beneﬁts of competition for the ex-post duration of the works.
Assessing the beneﬁts of publicity in public procurement auctions requires going
through the following steps: ﬁrst, one should ask whether, and to what extent, advertis-
ing inﬂuences competition; second, one should ask how competition, as it is inﬂuenced
by advertising policy, aﬀects the price paid by the auctioneer to the winning bidder,
i.e. it determines the auctioneer’s rent. As for the ﬁrst point, notice that a ﬁrm can
join an auction only if the ﬁrm knows that the auction exists. Since participating in an
auction requires sustaining some ﬁxed cost, however, a ﬁrm might decide not to par-
ticipate if it thinks that competition will be too harsh.2 As for the second point, it is
well accepted that an increase in the number of participants increases the auctioneer’s
rent: ﬁrms are pushed to bid more aggressively if the number of bids is increased.3
Beyond that, advertising can aﬀect participants’ characteristics, by stimulating entry
of outsiders (i.e. those ﬁrms which are located outside the region where the auction is
taking place). Outsiders might decrease the likelihood of collusion, since local ﬁrms ﬁnd
2Indeed, suppose you are an entrepreneur and that yours is one of the few companies which know
that the tender is taking place. When deciding whether to participate or not in the auction, you will
take into account that the number of competitors that you will face is small and that the likelihood of
submitting a winning bid is high. As a result, your incentives to join the auction are likely to be very
high. Now, suppose that one day you open your favorite national newspaper and realize that another
contracting authority is advertising a similar tender. If the agency did not advertise the tender, surely
you would not have participated: you actually would not have any clue that tender was taking place.
However, your incentives to participate are now smaller: since the tender is advertised on a national
newspaper, you expect competition to be harsh. You might then decide not to participate because your
expected proﬁts (which are a function of the probability of submitting a winning bid) are not enough
to oﬀset your participation costs. In other words, increasing the number of potential participants has
an ambiguous eﬀect on auction’s outcome.
3See, for example, Brannman et al. (1987) and Klemperer (2002).
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it more diﬃcult to coordinate, having fewer contacts with competitors.4 Outsiders can
even have a diﬀerent cost structure: ﬁrms located far from the auctioneer participate
only if their costs to operate at distance are very low. On the other hand, wide publicity
may discourage entry of local ﬁrms since, ceteris paribus, the incentive to participate is
lower when more ﬁrms are applying. Local ﬁrms may have a deeper knowledge of the
procedure implemented and of the work’s features and they can exploit scale economies
by dealing with the same authority more than once. It turns out that if local ﬁrms are
driven out of the market, there can be an eﬃciency loss. It is not clear, then, what is
the magnitude of the eﬀect on auctioneers’ rent which is associated to publicity and its
selective eﬀect rather than to its direct eﬀect, on the number of participants. Figure
(2.1) oﬀers a graphical representation of these simple concepts.
To analyze this issue, we introduce a simple model of ﬁrst price sealed bid auc-
tions with participation costs where the number of bidders is endogenously determined.
Under certain assumptions (namely: that publicity reduces ﬁrms’ searching costs), we
show that the optimal level of publicity can be below its maximum possible level, in-
dependently of its cost. It turns out that a rule forcing contracting authorities to a
certain publicity level may reduce the revenues of the auctioneer and thus reduce wel-
fare, in a context of public procurement auctions. Next, we empirically test the eﬀect of
publicity on competition exploiting the discontinuities generated by the Italian law on
public procurement which imposes diﬀerent levels of publicity according to the auction’s
starting value. Italian law prescribes that every public procurement auction should be
advertised at 1 of the 4 diﬀerent available publicity levels (Local, Regional, National,
European) on the basis of their starting value.5 Our empirical analysis is based on
a unique administrative data set from the Italian Authority for Surveillance of Public
Procurement (“Autorita’ per La Vigilanza sui Lavori Pubblici”, AVLP). The Authority
collects data on the universe of Italian public procurement auctions, for tenders starting
value greater or equal to 150,000 (we had access to the data referring to the period
2000-2005). A Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD), a quasi-experimental setting,
can then be used to compare the outcomes of auctions with starting value immediately
above or below each discontinuity threshold. Auctions above and below the thresholds
have diﬀerent publicity levels, but should otherwise be identical in terms of observable
and unobservable characteristics determining the outcome of interest, which in our case
are: the number of bidders and the winning rebate. Using this source of identiﬁcation
of the causal eﬀect we show that increasing tenders’ publicity from local to regional
4See Compte et al. (2005).
5In particular see Law n. 109 del 11 February 1994, so called “Legge Merloni”; “Legge quadro in
materia di lavori pubblici”
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determines an average increase of 19 percentage points in the number of bidders with
respect to a sample average of 38, and an average increase in the winning rebate of 4.9
percentage points with respect to a sample average of 16 %. A back of the envelope
calculation suggests that if all the auctions that by law are published at local level were
published at regional level then average revenues would have been increased by 25,000
for tenders with average starting value of 516,000, provided that the average cost of
publishing at regional level is 1,000. In contrast to the regional eﬀect, we observe no
eﬀect on the number of bidders and the winning rebate when publicity is increased from
regional to national level.6 Interestingly, on the other hand, we observe that an increase
in publicity from national to European level has no eﬀect on the number of bidders but
it determines an increase in the winning rebate of 10 percentage points. This suggests
that selection of the bidders via advertisement plays a major role when the auction has
an European relevance.
Further, we analyze the relationship between competition in auctions and the time
to accomplish the works after the auction has taken place. It might be, indeed, that a
substantial increase in the number of participants encourages ﬁrms to over-bid inducing
a non sustainable commitment for the winner.7 Using duration analysis models, we
report evidence of a negative and statistically signiﬁcant correlation between the time it
takes for the winner to accomplish the tendered works and the number of participants
or the winning rebate.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section (2.2) we describe the related
literature, in Section (2.3) we introduce the theoretical model, Section (2.4) describes
the institutional framework; Section (2.5) reports the empirical analysis. Conclusions
and policy implications are discussed in Section (2.7).
2.2 Related Literature
The literature looking at what fosters competition in public procurement auctions is
large. In this paper we mainly draw from the theoretical contributions of Levin and
Smith (1994) and Menezes and Monteiro (1996, 2000) and we consider the link between
publicity and competition in a stylized model of endogenous entry to auctions where
entry is costly and advertising tenders decreases ﬁrms’ search costs. Both Levin and
Smith (1994) and Menezes and Monteiro (1996, 2000) consider a mechanism by which
ﬁrms decide whether or not to participate in an auction. They diﬀer, though, in the
6As Table (2.5) shows, the eﬀect on the number of bidders would be negative, if any, at a 10%
signiﬁcance level
7This is the well known winner’s curse phenomenon
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timing dimension of their models: in Levin and Smith (1994) ﬁrms incur a ﬁxed cost
of entry before seeing their values for the object while in Menezes and Monteiro (1996,
2000) ﬁrms learn their values prior to incurring bid preparation costs. Their conclusions
are thus diﬀerent: Levin and Smith (1994) suggest that the seller should not limit entry
through a restriction policy (e.g. an entry fee) while Menezes and Monteiro (1996, 2000)
ﬁnd that entry fees may be optimal for the seller since they help to screen low valuation
bidders when increased competition reduces the seller’s expected revenue. Our model
follows the one used by Menezes and Monteiro (1996, 2000) and integrates it with the
possibility for the seller to advertise the tender.
From an empirical point of view, the eﬀect of advertising tenders on competition
has never been directly tested. Bajari and Hortacsu (2003) use a structural analysis
to test the model of Levin and Smith (1994) with a dataset of E-Bay coin auctions.
They ﬁnd that the expectation of one additional bidder decreases bids by 3.2% in a
representative auction. In addition, they ﬁnd that the value of the object is among
the main determinants of entry. They do not consider advertising, though. Lundberg
(2005) investigates the choice of procurement procedure in public auctions in Sweden
where the contracting entity may choose one among several available mechanisms which
are linked with diﬀerent restrictions on entry. Indeed, since publicity is a tool used to
favor entry, the choice of advertising an auction may be seen as the choice of relaxing
entry restrictions. Lundberg’s (descriptive) results do not show any signiﬁcant impact
from contract speciﬁcations and municipality characteristics on the probability that the
contracting authority does not restrict entry. Finally Leslie and Zoido (2007) study how
markets can provide private incentives to increase the provision of information in pub-
lic procurement auctions. They ﬁnd evidence that the introduction of an ’information
entrepreneur’, i.e. an entrepreneur who collects and sells announcements about forth-
coming auctions, causes a 2.9 % decrease in the cost for drug procurement in public
hospitals in Buenos Aires, Argentina.
Our paper aims at supplementing this literature with empirical results based on (quasi-)
experimental evidence.
2.3 Theoretical Framework
In this section we introduce a theoretical framework for the question tested by our
empirical analysis. The model described below is a tool which allows to grasp the
economic phenomenon underlying the issue tackled by this paper i.e. the eﬀect of an
increase in tender’s advertisement level. The empirical analysis, though, is not supposed
to test the predictions of the model. Indeed, as described in the following section,
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the auctions included in our database show some similarities with the traditional ﬁrst
price auction model but cannot be properly considered as such, since they implement a
complex model of selection of the bids. While a speciﬁc model capable to capture this
complexity would go beyond the scope of this paper, the model described below lets us
achieve a main result, reported in proposition 1, which we believe to hold also in the
context of the data used in the empirical analysis.
Following Menezes and Monteiro (2000) - henceforth (MM) - we model a public
procurement auction as a ﬁrst price sealed bid auction where the number of bidders is
endogenous. A single contract is put out to tender. The auctioneer is assumed to have
zero reserve price. Firms bid a rebate b on the auction’s starting amount for which they
would be willing to do the works. Bidder i knows her own value vi of the contract and
the distribution F(vi),∀i  = j of other n bidders’ values. F(.) is continuous with support
[0,v]. Participating to the auction requires sustaining a ﬁxed cost c plus some searching
cost δ which for the moment are assumed to be 0.8 Each bidder decides whether to
submit a bid before knowing how many competitors will participate in the auction.
Assuming that everyone else except i use the same strategy b, we have that i’s expected
proﬁts are:





where vρ solves vρF(vρ)n−1−c and it is such that πi(vρ,b∗) = 0 i.e. vρ is the cut-oﬀ value
when all bidders use the same equilibrium strategy b∗.9 The optimal bidding strategy




F(v)n−1 ,v ≥ vρ0,v < vρ (2.1)
Equation (1) is crucial. It tells us that increasing the number of potential participants
has two opposite eﬀects on the optimal bidding strategy. On the one hand, since the
cut-oﬀ value vρ value is increasing in n (provided that c < 1), it decreases the probability
that a player i participates to the auction (since that happens only if vi > vρ). On the
other hand, it increases the equilibrium bid, since participating players take into account
that, in equilibrium, other bidders participate only if their value is greater than vρ.






8You may well think about c as the cost of preparing a project and submit a bid, while δ is the cost
of looking around for existing tenders.
9(MM) show that such strategy exists. Notice that for any c < 1, v
′
ρ(n) < 0.
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MM then show that the revenue generated by a ﬁrst price sealed bid auction is equivalent
to that generated by a second price sealed bid auction when the number of potential
players is ﬁxed and participation is endogenous. It turns out that R can be rewritten
as follows:




Now suppose that the auctioneer is able to control the number of participants in order
to maximize her revenue. MM uses a variable δ ∈ (−c,1 − c) which represents an entry
fee (if positive) or a subsidy (if negative). In our context, δ represents ﬁrms’ searching
cost, which are assumed to be decreasing in the level of publicity. Let us introduce
a new continuous variable p ∈ [0,δ] which is directly correlated with the auctioneer’s
advertising eﬀort. Let us assume that a marginal increase in p is translated in an
equivalent reduction in δ at a cost
p2
2 λz, where z is the advertising cost (e.g. the cost
of publishing the tender on a national newspaper) and λ is the shadow cost of public
expenditure.
Thus, total revenue can be maximized by:












ϕ′(δ−p∗) = −n(n−1)(1−F(vρ(δ−p∗)))vρ(δ−p∗)  (F(vρ(δ−p∗)))n−2f(vρ(δ−p∗))v′
ρ(δ−p∗)−p∗λz = 0
(2.2)
which implicitly deﬁnes the optimal level of publicity p∗.
Equation (2) has a simple and powerful implication: the optimal level of publicity
may be lower than its maximum possible level even if its cost is zero i.e. z = 0 ; p∗ = δ.
In other words, it might be optimal for the auctioneer not to increase the number of
potential bidders in order to increase its revenue, even if it did not spend anything to
do so. The intuition comes directly from equation (1). Indeed, to show that this is the
case, it is suﬃcient to ﬁnd at least one case in which the optimal level of δ is positive
notwithstanding z = 0. The following example illustrates this possibility.10
Assume that the n players are represented by random draws from the distribution
F(x) = x4 and p = z = 0. Expected revenue is then:
R = 4n(n − 1)
 
1 − c − δ
4n − 3
−





10Example 1 is similar to example 4 of MM.
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Assume further that n = 20 and c = 0.1. It turns out that the level of δ which maximizes
R is positive and it is δ = 0.031.
We can then state the following proposition:
Independently of its cost, the optimal level of publicity can be below its maximum
possible level.
It follows directly from example 1.
From a policy point of view Proposition (2.3) suggests that a rule prescribing a unique
level of publicity, given the starting value of the auction can be sub-optimal.11 In this
paper we show that this can be the case once we have considered tenders’ publicity
at national level. Indeed, the empirical analysis reported in section (2.5) shows that
increasing publicity from regional to national level has no eﬀect on the winning rebate
and no or negative eﬀect on the number of bidders.
We now proceed illustrating the data and the institutional framework.
2.4 Data and Institutional Framework
We base our empirical analysis on a unique administrative data set from the Italian Au-
thority for Surveillance of Public Procurement (“Autorit` a per la Vigilanza sui Lavori
Pubblici”, AVLP), which collects data on the universe of public procurement auctions
in Italy for public works with starting value greater or equal to 150,000 euros. For our
analysis we refer to the data collected between 2000 and 2005. The database includes
information at auction level on the contracting authority (i.e. the auctioneer which is
also the buyer), the advertisement level, on the typology of the works which are put
out to tender, on bidding behavior and on the identity of the winning ﬁrms (i.e. the
seller). Tables (2.1) and (2.2) report the descriptive statistics relative to the sample.
Our database amounts to 41510 auctions with direct participation of ﬁrms (’Pubblico
Incanto’ in the terminology used by the law). The contracting authorities are mainly
municipalities (52% of the sample). The rest of the sample is made up of tenders in-
vited by provinces (12%), health-care public bodies (ASL) and other public bodies or
corporations.12 The contracting authorities in the sample are mainly located in the
North of Italy, (45%), while 25 % are in the Center and 22 % are in the South of Italy.
11Notice that there might be other reasons why a uniform level of publicity could be desirable, though.
The most obvious one is that a case by case analysis for deciding which is the optimal level of publicity
would be very expensive and likely unfeasible.
12We do not report those ﬁgures (they are available on request).
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Similar ﬁgures are reported in Table (2.2) once we consider the descriptive statistics
for the main typologies of auctions. Some diﬀerences in the descriptive statistics of the
typology “Road and Constructions” can be observed, although no diﬀerence exist in the
general provision of the law for the diﬀerent typologies analyzed.
The contracting authority must deﬁne all the details concerning the works that have
to be carried on by the winning ﬁrm, including the starting price that the auctioneer
would pay to the winner if only one ﬁrm participates to the auction. On average, the
auctions’ starting value in the sample amounts to 720 thousands of euros, though the
standard deviation is rather high. Indeed, the median starting value is 360 thousands of
euros. Notice, moreover, that most of the auctions are done to contract out road’s con-
structions (30.6% of the total) which include maintenance, reconstruction and whatever
is necessary to guarantee truckage, by rail and air transport. The contracting authority
must deﬁne the requirements which have to be satisﬁed by bidders as well. Bidders have
to be certiﬁed that they are able to carry on the works of that particular size and in
that particular sector i.e. they need to be audited by an attestor society (SOA, societ` a
organismo di attestazione) and be registered for the required category in a speciﬁc book.
So, for example, if the construction of a road is put out to tender and the contracting
authority estimates that the amount of qualiﬁed work that has to be done is valued
700,000 euros, the required SOA category will likely be: 3-OG3, where 3 refers to the
size of the works and OG3 to the category “road constructions”. The size requirements
are mainly based on ﬁrms’ turnover.13 Table (2.1) reports that 13% of the auctions
require the category Buildings e.g. OG1, while 29% of the auctions a SOA category, e.g.
size of the works of 3.
All the auctions considered in the following analysis are structured as ﬁrst-price sealed-
bid auctions: ﬁrms bid the price for which they are willing to do the works in the form of
a percentage reduction - rebate - with respect to the auction’s starting value. In all the
considered auctions the selection criterion for the winner is uniquely based on the rebate
i.e. the technical component of ﬁrms’ oﬀer plays no role (provided that the winner will
satisfy some minimum quality standards which are set by the contracting authority).
Notice, however, that because of the institutional mechanism prescribed by the law, the
winning rebate is not necessarily the highest bidden: in order to prevent ﬁrms from
over-bidding (i.e. bidding a price which does not allow to recoup works’ expenses) a
13Notice that the required SOA category is not a direct function of the auction’s starting value. Indeed,
the works to be done are usually a complex combination of several expertises and hence the required
SOA categories may be more than once. For our analysis we consider just the primary required SOA
category. Moreover, by a careful study of the Law 109/94 we exclude that both requirements change
discontinuously at the publicity thresholds.
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complex (and criticizable) mechanism is implemented. According to this rule, all bids
which exceed the average bid by more than the average deviation from the average are
automatically excluded.14 It turns out that the auctions included in our database are
not proper ﬁrst price auctions.
The ﬁrst ﬁve rows of Table (2.1) report descriptive statistics of auctions’ outcomes.
In the sample, it is observed that the average number of ﬁrms participating to the
auction is 32 (standard deviation is 35), and a median of 21. The winning rebate is
on average 16% (standard deviation is 8.9), which is very close to the median value
(15%). To further characterize the nature of competition within auctions we consider
three main indicators: the probability of a winner coming from outside the region were
the auction is held, the legal nature of the winner, and the indication of whether the
winner is a member of a group of related ﬁrms. In the sample the probability that the
winner is coming from outside the region is 37 % while only 6.5% of the winners are
public companies and 18% of the winners are member of a group of ﬁrms.
Concerning tenders’ advertisement, until July 2006, auctions were classiﬁed by the law
according to their starting value.15 Table (2.3) illustrates that rule: the ﬁrst column
reports y, the auction’s starting value (in hundreds of thousands euro), the second col-
umn reports the level of publicity required by the law, the third and the fourth columns
reports the correspondent cost of advertising and the percentage of non-compliance to
the prescribed rule, respectively.
According to Table (2.3), auctions with starting value below 500 thousands of euros have
to be published on the contracting authority’s notice board. This is the least amount of
possible publicity, since only ﬁrms which have direct access to the auctioneer’s premises
or have direct contact with its staﬀ may get information on the tender. The cost of
publishing on the notice board is zero. Not surprisingly, the degree of compliance is
very high: 94% of the auctions observe the prescribed rule. The second interval goes
from 500 thousands to one million and it identiﬁes those auctions for which the compul-
sory level of publicity is regional i.e. those tenders that must be advertised in at least
14Bidders thus have to guess which will be these ’anomaly thresholds’, as they are called, and try to
place a bid within them. As for illustration, consider this simple example. In a hypothetical auction
there are three participants placing the following bids (rebates to the auction’s starting value): 5, 6 and
19. The average bid is thus 10. The average diﬀerence from the average bid is 6. Thus the bottom and
the upper anomaly thresholds are 4 and 16 respectively. It turns out that in this case the winning bid
is 6 even if 19 is the highest bidden rebate. Albano et al. (2006b) provide a summary of the properties
of several winning methods in public procurement auctions.
15From July 2006, Law 163/2006 removes the thresholds and forces the contracting authorities to
publish on GURI at a national newspaper level, regardless of the auction’s starting value (if it is greater
than 150,000 euros). By focusing on data before 2006, this paper provides insights to assess that reform.
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two newspapers spread all over the province where the works should be made and in
the oﬃcial regional journal (Bollettino Uﬃciale Regionale, BUR). Publishing on BUR
is very cheap: an average tender should not cost more than 200-500 euros. Provincial
newspapers are cheap as well, since advertisement’s price is proportional to the num-
ber of printed copies. However, the degree of compliance is rather low: only 71% of
the auctions satisfy the publicity requirements. The third level of publicity is national
and concerns those tenders with starting values above one million of euros and below
the community threshold (ﬁve million of SDR, special drawing rights16). These tenders
must be published on two national and two regional newspapers and on the national
oﬃcial journal (Gazzetta Uﬃciale della Repubblica Italiana, GURI). The average cost
for publishing on a national newspaper is about 800 euros (somewhat less for a regional
newspaper). GURI, though, is very expensive: publishing a tender’s abstract may cost
around 7-8 thousands of euros. The degree of compliance is here as well rather low: 78%.
Finally, the maximum amount of publicity is enforced when tenders’ starting value is
above the community threshold. In that case the contracting authority must also adver-
tise on the Oﬃcial Journal of the European Community (Gazzetta Uﬃciale Comunit` a
Europea, GUCE) in addition to the obligations deﬁned for the tenders belonging to
the previous group. Notice, however, that publishing on GUCE is free of charge, so no
additional cost is sustained by the contracting authorities. The degree of compliance is
consistently rather high: 90%.
A major concern on the assignment of public tenders to publicity levels is the possibility
for authorities of splitting the starting value of the auction in order to avoid the pub-
lication. Art. 24 of of Law 109/1994 prescribes that a public authority must not split
or vary a particular procurement need in order to circumvent the monetary threshold
requirements. In Sections (2.5.2) and (2.7) we provide statistical evidence of no system-
atic sorting around the thresholds.
Summarizing, in our sample: 92% of the tenders were published on the contracting au-
thority’s notice board, 25% on the Regional BUR and about 18% on the GURI. On the
other hand, the average number of newspapers on which the advertisement of the tender
appeared is: 0.24 for provincial newspapers, 0.42 for regional newspapers and 0.61 for
national newspapers. From a more general perspective we can conclude that the sample
show a suﬃciently large variation in the data leaving the possibility for the econometric
analysis which is illustrated in the following Section.
16At the time of writing, 5,000,000 SDR were equivalent to 6,550,000 euros.
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2.5 The Empirical Analysis
2.5.1 Identiﬁcation strategy
Contracting authorities which maximize the auctioneer’s revenue implement diﬀerent ad-
vertisement strategies with respect to contracting authorities which pursue other aims,
such as maximize political rents through collusion with local ﬁrms. Authorities’ unob-
servable incentives determine a non random assignment to publicity levels which causes
endogeneity problem; we thus expect Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates of the
eﬀects of publicity on competition to be a wrong estimate of the true causal eﬀect of
publicity on competition, no matter how big the sample it is. To disentangle the causal-
ity relationship between publicity and auction’s outcome discussed in Figure (2.1), we
implement a more reﬁned technique: the Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD). In
Section (2.4) we saw that a higher level of publicity (the treatment) is assigned to
auctions if an observed covariate, the starting value of the auction, crosses a known
threshold. We are aware that using exogenous thresholds which are identiﬁed by the
law is not equivalent to a controlled experiment because individuals’ assignment might
be not completely random. Lee (2007), however, shows that in these cases the RDD can
nevertheless identify impact estimates that share the same validity as those resulting
from a randomized experiment.
In this Section we discuss the assumptions required to implement the RDD. We deﬁne
yj as the j-th threshold in the auctions’ starting value which determines a discontinuity
point in the support of the publicity function, as established by the law. The j − th
discontinuity point separates the j and j + 1 levels in publicity assignment imposed to
contractors. We call these levels “publicity brackets”. We aim at identifying the causal
eﬀect of publicity on auctions’ outcomes by focusing on auctions in the neighborhood
of those discontinuity points. Let Y be the auction’s real starting value (the so called
running variable), and Z be the level of theoretical publicity that the contractor should
implement under perfect compliance to the assignment rule. We denote by P the level
of publicity actually observed in the auction. P may diﬀer from its theoretical level if
the contracting authority does not comply with the law assignment: indeed, it is very
unlikely that a contracting authority would be punished from AVLP if P diﬀers from
Z.17 Finally let C represent the outcome of auctions. In the analysis we alternatively
consider C to be the number of bidders or the winning rebate. Let Cl and Ch being
17Notice, by Law a violation of the publicity requirements invalidates the proceedings of the public
auction and the person in charge of the auction can be persecuted by both the criminal and the admin-
istrative law for such violations. Nonetheless, to overcome the non-perfect compliance problem of the
contracting authorities to the publicity Law, we use a Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity Design.
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the values of C respectively below and above the generic discontinuity point j. To
identify the causal eﬀect of publicity on competition we need the following continuity
assumptions:
E{Cl|Y = y+
j } = E{Cl|Y = y−
j } (2.3)
E{Pl|Y = y+




j represent the left and the right limits of the starting value of the
auction. As in Hahn et al. (2001) and Garibaldi et al. (2007), under the continuity
conditions, for an auction in a neighborhood of the cut-oﬀ point the mean eﬀect of being
assigned to a higher theoretical publicity bracket Z = h (instead of the lower one Z = l)
on the actual publicity level P and on the competition level C are:
E{P|y+
j } − E{P|y−
j }. (2.5)
E{C|y+
j } − E{C|y−
j }. (2.6)
(5) and (6) are usually called the intention-to-treat (ITT) eﬀects.18
Following Angrist et al. (2000) seminal paper we interpret the ratio of the two ITT
eﬀects of expressions (5) and (6) as the causal eﬀect of P on C (of publicity on compe-
tition). This can be done only if two more conditions are satisﬁed: the validity of the
exclusion restriction and the monotonicity condition. The exclusion restriction requires
that the theoretical publicity Z aﬀects the outcome, C, only through the observed level
of publicity (which is reasonable in our context, see Section (2.4) where the Institu-
tional framework is discussed). The monotonicity condition requires that no auction is
induced to display a lower (higher) actual level of publicity if the theoretical publicity
is exogenously moved from l to h (from h to l).
If the three assumptions are satisﬁed, then the ratio:
Π(yj) =
E{C|y+
j } − E{C|y−
j }
E{P|y+
j } − E{P|y−
j }
, (2.7)
identiﬁes the average eﬀect of a change in the actual level of publicity on the level of
competition at Y = yj for those who are induced to show a higher level of publicity
because their theoretical publicity increases from l to h.
We plot in Figure (2.3) non-parametric estimates of the main variables of interest. The
two boxes on the left plot P on Y at the discontinuity thresholds 1 and 2, respectively.
18To keep the notation as simple as possible, we omit time subscripts. In the empirical analysis we
consider all the relations conditioned on time periods.
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The other two boxes on the right plot the number of bidders on Y for the same dis-
continuity points. We estimate these locally weighted smoothing regression separately
on the left and on the right of the cut-oﬀ points. Jumps in the plots show the eﬀect of
the threshold on the variable of interest thus oﬀering a graphical interpretation of the
intention-to-treat eﬀects as deﬁned by equations (2.5), and (2.6). As it can be noticed,
the ﬁgures show that the actual publicity is uniformly not lower than the theoretical
publicity on both discontinuities at the left of the threshold. At the right of the thresh-
old we observe some problems of compliance with the law on publicity but not that big
to violate the monotonicity condition required by RDD, as pointed out in Garibaldi et
al. (2007). Concerning the number of bidders, we observe a jump at the right of the
ﬁrst cut-oﬀ point while a drop at the second. The mean impact of the actual publicity
on competition, which is the ratio of the jump of the level of competition and the jump
of the level of actual publicity, turns out to be positive at the ﬁrst discontinuity and
negative but very small at the second. The ﬁgures show that there is a substantial eﬀect
of publicity on competition at the ﬁrst threshold. This impact weakens at discontinuity
2 and 3 (not reported in the ﬁgures).
To implement the RDD to our analysis we go through the following steps, (see Imbens
and Lemieux (2007)):
1. Inspect the Graphical Analysis,
2. Estimate the treatment eﬀect using TSLS (IV-LATE) where standard errors are
computed using the usual (robust) TSLS standard errors,
3. Assess the identiﬁcation assumptions by looking at possible jumps in the value of
pre-treatment variables at the cut-oﬀ point and implement a formal test for the
lack of continuity of the density function of the running variable (i.e. auction’s
starting value),
4. Assess the robustness of the results using alternative models and additional spec-
iﬁcations.
2.5.2 Graphical Analysis
According to Table (2.3) publicity is a discontinuous function of the auction’s starting
value. We thus have:
Coviello, Decio (2009), Three Essays in Applied Economics 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/11959Chapter 2. Publicity, Potential, and Actual Competition 22
P =

       
       
P Geographical Level Running V ariable
0 Local if 1.5 ≤ Y < 5
1 Regional if 5 ≤ Y < 10
2 National if 10 ≤ Y < Y ∗
3 EU if Y ≥ Y ∗
Where Y is the starting value of the auction expressed in 100,000 euro (real value year
2000) and Y ∗ varies across the year of analysis. Due to non perfect compliance, we




    
    
0 if 1.5 ≤ Y < 5
1 if 5 ≤ Y < 10
2 if 10 ≤ Y < Y ∗
3 if Y ≥ Y ∗
Under perfect compliance Z and P should coincide. Figure (2.2) shows that this is not
the case in our context: the green line (which represents the actual publicity) indeed do
not overlap with the orange line (which represents the theoretical publicity). Because
of this diﬀerences we consider a ”Fuzzy” Regression Discontinuity Design.
To graphically inspect the validity of the continuity assumption we implement two
graphical methods that are complementary. We follow Mc Crary (2007), and Lee (2007)
to support our identiﬁcation strategy.
Figure (2.4) shows that the distribution of the auctions’ starting value is right skewed.
No signiﬁcant mass probability around each of thresholds is identiﬁed, although a sus-
pect of a peak is observed at discontinuity two. An abnormal mass in the distribution
of the starting value around each of the thresholds may suggest a lack of continuity in
the density function of the running variable. We further investigate on this possibility
considering the density based test ` a la Mc Crary (2007).19 The inspection consists in
two steps. In the ﬁrst step we obtain a very undersmoothed histogram of the distribu-
tion of the starting value where the bins of the histogram are deﬁned carefully enough
that no one histogram bin includes both points to the left and right of the discontinuity
point. In the second step we run a local linear smoothing of the histogram where we
treat the midpoints of the histogram bins as a regressor, and the normalized counts of
the number of observations of the bins are considered as the outcome variable. Figure
19We comment this graphical inspection of the estimated density function at discontinuity one only,
see Figure (2.5). Results for the other discontinuities are available from the authors.
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(2.5) suggests that there are no jumps in the density estimates.
As discussed in Lee (2007) we further investigate this issue through the pre-intervention
variables. We deﬁne our set of pre-intervention variables from the detailed information
available to the researchers. These variables, in principle, should meet the following two
conditions: they should not be aﬀected by the publicity law, but they may depend on
the same unobservables (e.g. eﬃciency/collusion of the contractors with participants),
likely to aﬀect the level of competition C. To test the continuity condition we use the
information available on the person in charge to take care of the auction’s administrative
process and on the administrative nature of the contracting authority. In particular in
ﬁgure (2.6) we plot and indicator of whether the age of the person in charge is above
the median distribution, and an indicator of whether the contracting authority is the
municipality against Y , the starting values, and we analyze the behavior of the plots
around the three discontinuities thresholds. In the graphical analysis we present the
plots on these two pre-treatment variables around discontinuity 1 and 2. A characteris-
tic of these variables is they are observed before the determination of the publicity levels
and before the auction takes place, thus they can be used as pre-treatment variables.
The graphical test for the continuity assumption would suggest evidence of sorting and
lack of continuity if the plots of these indicators against Y would show a jump at the
cut-oﬀ points. Identiﬁcation would not be possible in those cases since auctions assigned
to high theoretical level of publicity Zh would be not comparable to auctions assigned
to a low level of publicity Zl with respect to unobservables relevant for the outcome C.
Figure (2.6) shows that there are no jumps at the ﬁrst threshold while jumps are very
small at the second.
Thus the graphical analysis suggests the presence of no manipulation of the running
variable Y .
In addition to the graphical analysis, Table (2.4) reports descriptive statistics of the auc-
tions’ observable characteristics around discontinuity 1. In this table we check whether
the observable covariates are balanced to the right and to the left of the ﬁrst threshold.
The rationale of this check is that around discontinuities we should not observe any
jump in the observable characteristics with the exception of the outcome of the auctions
and the publicity level. Except for some diﬀerences in the required category (SOA3)
we observe no systematic diﬀerences around discontinuity one. We further inspect the
institutional requirement for the SOA categories, and we exclude by the study of the
publicity law any systematic shift of the SOAs’ categories at discontinuity one.20
In the following Section we further investigates these graphical results by considering a
20see Section (2.4).
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battery of regression based tests.
2.5.3 Regression Analysis: Discontinuities Eﬀects
Van der Klaauw (2002), among others, discusses how to estimate the intention-to-treat
eﬀects as deﬁned by equations (2.5), and (2.6). In this paper we consider a fully para-
metric model representation to evaluate the causal eﬀects of publicity on competition
running several versions of the following equation:
Ci = α + βPi + ǫi (2.8)
When assignment to treatment is not random, endogeneity bias in the estimation of β
can rise because of a dependence between Pi and ǫi. In this case E[ǫ/P]  = 0 and then any
OLS estimate of equation (2.8) will deliver inconsistent estimates of β. Using Regression
Discontinuity design we have additional information on the selection in to the treatment
rule. To see how the eﬀect of publicity can be identiﬁed and estimated with RD design
we have to compare a sample of individuals within a very small interval around the
cutoﬀ because they are essentially identical but they diﬀer for the level of publicity. Van
der Klaauw (2002) clearly explain that increasing the interval around the cutoﬀ point
is likely to induce a bias in the eﬀect estimate, especially if the assignment variable was
itself related to the outcome variable conditional on treatment status. In this paper,
as suggested by Angrist and Lavy (1999), Van der Klaauw (2002) and Garibaldi et al.
(2007), we specify and include the conditional mean function E[ǫ/P,Y ] as a “control
function” in the outcome equation:
Ci = g(Yi) + βPi + δt + ωi (2.9)
where g(Yi) is a third order polynomial in Y , P the observed level of publicity, δ is a year
indicator, and ω = Ci − E[Ci/Pi,Yi]. Providing that we can correctly specify g(Yi) we
gain the property that E[ω/Y ] = 0 and thus equation (2.9) can be correctly estimated
via OLS because P will be free from correlation with the disturbances.
As discussed in section (2.4) the assignment to treatment is known to depend partially
on the running variable Y and partially on other unobservable phenomena (e.g. local
collusion, perverse incentives, or simply measurement error) that can potentially be
correlated with the unobservable components of the outcome equation. This second
type of Regression Discontinuity design is referred to the literature as “fuzzy”. As in
Angrist and Lavy (1999), Van der Klaauw (2002) and Garibaldi et al. (2007) we propose
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a fully parametric approach and we assume that the assignment to treatment status can
be summarized by the following equation:
Pi = g(Yi) + γZi + δt + νi (2.10)
We estimate the causal eﬀect of publicity on competition via Two Stages Least Squares
(TSLS, or IV-LATE) with Z = 1{Yi ≥ Y } as excluded instruments and the polynomial
g(Yi) as included one.
In reporting the estimation results of equation (2.9) we comment the estimates at each
of the three discontinuity thresholds generated by the publicity law.
Table (2.5) reports the estimated coeﬃcients,   β, of the eﬀects of publicity on auctions’
outcomes of Equation (2.9). In the two Panels A, and B, of Table (2.5), we report the
sample averages of the outcomes of interest (the number of bidders and the winning
rebate), the intention-to-treat, the OLS and the IV-LATE estimates with the (robust)
standard errors for the coeﬃcients of publicity only. The odd rows, starting from the
third report the estimated coeﬃcients considering separately the three diﬀerent discon-
tinuities in the publicity function.
Column 1 of Table (2.5) reports the intention-to-treat eﬀect of theoretical publicity (e.g.
the excluded instrument) on actual (e.g. the observed level) publicity.21 The estimates
indicate that an increase from a lower starting value bracket, say 1.5 − 5 hundreds of
thousand of euros, to an higher one, say 5 − 10 hundreds of thousand of euros, shifts
the actual publicity by 0.2 with a standard error of 0.02 ( by the 0.36 with a standard
error of 0.07 if we consider the second income bracket, and by 0.65 with a standard
error of 0.21 if we consider the third income bracket). These results clearly identify a
lack of full treatment compliance due to non perfect law enforcement. We believe that
this problem is not such big to invalidate the monotonicity assumption required by the
RDD, see Garibaldi et al. (2007). Column 2 of Table (2.5) reports the intention-to-treat
eﬀect of theoretical publicity on the number of bidders and the winning rebate (Panel A,
and B). The estimates obtained separately for each discontinuity point are not statisti-
cally diﬀerent from zero. The OLS estimates of the number of bidders and the winning
rebate on the actual level of publicity suggest diﬀerent results: they show a negative
and statistically signiﬁcant correlation between publicity and the number of bidders at
21This is the estimated coeﬃcient of the instrument on the endogenous regressor. For all the estimates
the ratio between the estimated coeﬃcient and the standard error is the t-statistics which happen to
be always greater than two. In this model we have one instrument and thus the ﬁrst stage F-statistics
are just the square of the t-statistics. The ﬁrst-stage F are always greater than 10 (not reported, but
available on request) suggesting that the IV-LATE estimates are not aﬀected by the weak instruments
problem.
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discontinuity 2 and a negative and statistically signiﬁcant correlation between publicity
and the winning rebate at discontinuity 1 and 2.
Column 4 of Table (2.5) reports the Instrumental Variables Local Average Treatment
Eﬀects (henceforth, IV-LATE) estimates (and robust standard errors below) at each
discontinuity. The estimates around discontinuity 1, indicate that an increase in ten-
ders’ publicity, from local to regional levels, determines an average increase of 19 in the
number of bidders with respect to a sample average of 38, and an average increase in the
winning rebate of 4.9 with respect to a sample average of 16 %. Both eﬀects are statis-
tically diﬀerent from zero at 5 % signiﬁcance level. As anticipated in the Introduction,
this result suggests that increasing the publicity level from local to regional can yield
considerable beneﬁts for the contracting authority, such as an average saving of 25,000
euros for an auction with average starting value of 516,000 euros. The empirical analysis
support the validity of the law. In other words, the “knowledge eﬀect” of letting more
ﬁrms know about the existence of the auction here dominates the “deterrence eﬀect” of
a ﬁercer competition to be faced while bidding. This result is especially meaningful if
we consider that, at least in Italy, the cost of publishing at regional level is very low.
The estimates around discontinuity 2, indicate that, rather surprisingly, an increase in
tenders’ publicity, from regional to nation levels, determines a decrease of 21 in the
number of bidders with respect to a sample average of 38, and an average increase in
the winning rebate by 3 with respect to a sample average of 16 %. However, both eﬀects
are not statistically signiﬁcant at 5 %. It appears, thus, that shifting the publicity level
from regional to national, at the very last does not attract other potential bidders to
the auction. This rather striking result suggests that the regional level of publicity is
already suﬃcient to let potential national bidders be aware of the existence of the auc-
tion. Hence, any additional advertisement at national level would yield only additional
costs and no additional beneﬁts. Finally, the estimates around discontinuity 3 indicate
that an increase in tenders’ publicity, from national to European levels, determines an
average decrease of 6.4 in the number of bidders with respect to a sample average of 38,
and an average increase in the winning rebate of 10 with respect to a sample average of
16 %. The former eﬀect is not statistically signiﬁcant at 5 %, while the latter is statisti-
cally diﬀerent from zero at 5 % signiﬁcance level. This last result appears to be coherent
with the previous ones nd it suggests an additional interesting consideration: increasing
publicity to European level does not increase the number of bidders, but it probably
aﬀects the quality of them. When an auction causes a great stir at European level, most
eﬃcient ﬁrms likely move into play, keeping constant the number of participating ﬁrms
(because the least eﬃcient ﬁrms, knowing that they cannot compete, do not even apply)
but increasing the auctioneer’s rent by increasing the winning rebate. This explanation
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is of major interest and should be tested with further empirical investigation. We plan
to address this issue when new additional data will be available.
2.5.4 Sensitivity Analysis
One concern with our model so far it is that the apparently discontinuous relationship
between the level of competition and the publicity levels may be due to the model
speciﬁcation, to sample selection, or to the omission of the relevant characteristics of
public procurement auctions. In Section (2.3) the baseline model includes the third order
polynomial in the starting value and the year eﬀects only. This speciﬁcation may not be
suﬃciently ﬂexible to absorb all the auctions characteristics. To assess this possibility, in
Table (2.7) we present estimation results for 5 alternative speciﬁcations but we comment
the results for the winning rebate, only.22 In column 1 we reduce the discontinuity sample
by more than 50 %.23 The reduced discontinuity sample includes auctions with starting
vale between 4 and 6 hundred thousand euros instead of 3.5 and 7.99 hundred thousand
euros at discontinuity 1, auctions with starting vale between 9 and 11 hundred thousand
euros instead of 8 and 13 hundred thousand euros at discontinuity 2, and auctions with
starting vale between 55 and 75 hundred thousand euros instead of 20 and 111 hundred
thousand euros at discontinuity 3. In column 2 we add the fourth order power of the
starting value. In column 3 we add the fourth order power of the starting value and
reduce the discontinuity sample. In column 4 we add the LARGE information set. The
LARGE information set contains the following list of observable characteristics:
• Works’ characteristics: wether the works are for roads, education, culture, or other
• Auctions’ characteristics: the technical requirement to participate (OG, and RSOA
characteristics)
• Auctioneers’ characteristics: whether the contracting authority is the municipality
or the province.
Finally, in column 5 we add the fourth order polynomial in the starting value and the
LARGE information set.
In Table (2.7) the odd row reports the OLS estimates while the even rows report the
22Results on the number of bidders are available on request.
23Given the inclusion of the polynomial in the starting value, the control function, we did not perform
a cross-validation selection procedure of both the original discontinuity sample and the reduced sample
in order to select the sample windows around the three discontinuities. As expected we do not observe
a remarkable change in the results considering diﬀerent selections of the sample although we reduced
the sample by more than 50 %.
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across-models IV-LATE eﬀects of publicity on the winning rebate at each discontinuity
thresholds. We comment the IV-LATE eﬀects only.
In column 1, the reduced sample in the neighborhood of discontinuity 1 is of 5983 auc-
tions instead of the original discontinuity 1 sample of 11434 auctions. The reduced
sample estimates of the eﬀect of an increase in publicity from local to regional on the
winning rebate is of 6.2 percentage points with standard error 4.4 compared to 4.9 per-
centage points with standard error 2.1 of the baseline eﬀect. The point estimates appear
to be not remarkably diﬀerent but as expected estimated with less precision. We observe
the same pattern at discontinuities 2 and 3. Once we augment the model speciﬁcation
with the fourth order polynomial in the starting value, column 2, we estimate the eﬀect
of publicity on the winning rebate to be respectively 6.7 (with standard error 2.7), 2.5
(with standard error 2), and 9.9 (with standard error 4.7) at the three discontinuities.
The augmented model results appear to be pretty similar to the baseline estimates that
are 4.9 (with standard error 2.1), 3 (with standard error 2.1), and 10 (with standard
error 3.8) at the three discontinuities. In column 3 we both reduce the sample size by 50
% and add the fourth order polynomial in the starting value. The estimation results are
similar to the baseline eﬀects of publicity on the winning rebate only at discontinuity one
where the sample size is larger. Although the eﬀect of an increase in publicity from local
to regional is of 5.6 it has a standard error of 4.6 suggesting that it is not statistically
diﬀerent from zero. Estimation results in column 3 are not statistically diﬀerent from
zero at any of the three discontinuities. In columns 4-5 ﬁrstly we add at the baseline
speciﬁcation the set of regressors included in the LARGE information set; secondly we
add the fourth order polynomial in the starting value. Once we augment the model
speciﬁcation with the LARGE information set, column 4, we estimate the eﬀect of pub-
licity on the winning rebate to be respectively 4 (with standard error 2.1), 2.8 (with
standard error 2.1), and 13 (with standard error 6.7) at the three discontinuities. Once
we augment the model speciﬁcation with the LARGE information set and the fourth
order polynomial in the starting value, column 5, we estimate the eﬀect of publicity on
the winning rebate to be respectively 5.5 (with standard error 2.7), 2.2 (with standard
error 2.1), and 12 (with standard error 6.8) at the three discontinuities. The estimation
results of the augmented models reported in columns 4-5, are very similar to the base-
line estimates that are 4.9 (with standard error 2.1), 3 (with standard error 2.1), and 10
(with standard error 3.8) at the three discontinuities. Hence, sensitivity analysis results
appear to be robust to sample selection, functional form restrictions, and the inclusion
of the characteristics of the goods and the auctions.
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2.6 Beneﬁts from Competition: Duration Analysis
In this Section we ask whether an increase in competition in auction may lead to the
selection of more eﬃcient winners and, thus, to a reduction in the time needed to accom-
plish the works, provided that the works are satisfying tenders’ technical requirements.
We consider the time to accomplish the works provided that the works are satisfying
tenders’ technical requirements. We report evidence of a negative correlation between
proxies of competition and the time to accomplish the works. In particular we describe
the behavior of the hazard function, h(l) =
f(s)
S(s), deﬁned as the (instantaneous) proba-
bility of accomplishing the works at s given survival until s.24 We use duration analysis
models because our data are right-censored: indeed, several works are still not accom-
plished at the day the data were collected. Hence, for each i the observed duration Ti = t
is the minimum among the complete duration Li = l and the censored duration Ci = c.
We ﬁrst report non parametric hazard estimates and then we add some structure to
the hazard function in order to link its behavior to auctions’ indicators of competition.
In the non parametric analysis we let di(t) be the number of works accomplished at
duration t and ri(t) be the number of works at risk of being accomplished at time t with
















Figure (2.7) plots the Kaplan-Meier (KM) estimates of the survival function of the du-
ration of the works, by the number of bidders for road constructions. From left to
right, the orange line represents the KM estimates considering all the auctions where
the number of bidders are above the median of the sample distribution of the number of
bidders. The green line pools together all the observations while the blue line represents
auctions with the number of bidders below the median. According to Figure (2.7) the
survival functions are parallel, and always higher for auctions with number of bidders
below the median, which implies that they have a higher overall duration rate. Given
the properties of the non parametric KM survival function we add structure to the du-
24Let L ≥ 0 be the random variable representing the duration of the works (expressed as the number
of days between the moment in which the auction takes place and the accomplishment of the works) and
l the realized duration. F(l) = Pr[L ≤ l] is the cumulative distribution function, while S(l) = Pr[L >
l] = 1 − F(l) is the survival function.
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ration analysis and we implement a battery of parametric models to formally test the
statistical signiﬁcance of this ﬁnding. In the parametric models we pool together all the
available information and control for it by considering two set of information: MEDIUM
and LARGE.25 We base our analysis on the partial-likelihood approach proposed by Cox
(1972).26 We report the estimates of the ˆ β of a series of models as follow:
hi(t|x,β) = h0(t)eX′β (2.13)
where h0 is the baseline hazard probability. Table (2.8) reports the results of the analysis
on works’ duration. Columns 1 and 2 show the correlations between a shift of the number
of bidders and of the winning rebate above the median of their sample distribution,
respectively, with the hazard probability. The estimated coeﬃcients are reported in the
form of ˆ β (and not as hazard ratios) with the robust standard errors in parentheses. For
instance, the ﬁrst row ˆ β = 0.17 indicates that a shift of the number of bidders above the
median determines an increase in the hazard relative to the baseline hazard of 17% (and
hence a signiﬁcative reduction in the duration of the works). This eﬀect is signiﬁcant
at 1% level. A positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect is also observed for the winning rebate.
Evidence thus suggests a negative correlation between the number of bidders and the
winning rebate and the duration of the works.
The estimates thus report some preliminary evidence of the theoretical predictions by
Compte et al. (2002) suggesting that an increase the level of competition is correlated
to the eﬃciency of public good procurement.
2.7 Conclusions
Economic theory suggests that increasing the actual number of bidders in an auction
has a positive eﬀect on the auctioneer’s rent, Klemperer (2002). Increasing the number
of potential bidders via an increase in the level of publicity made to advertise the tender
has an ambiguous eﬀect on the auction’s outcome, though. On the one hand, a ﬁrm
may not be aware that a tender is taking place if the contracting authority does not
25Those characteristics are discussed in the previous section.
26We report the COX-PH model only. Results for Exponential, Weibull, and Gompertz are
available on request. Notice that this class of models requires the proportionality assump-
tion to write the hazard function as in equation (11). As suggested in Jenkins’ class notes
(http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/teaching/degree/stephenj/ec968/), we inspect the shape of the survival
function and we observe a parallelism among them. We thus considered feasible the implementation of
the proportional hazard class of models.
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advertise it. On the other hand, a ﬁrm might be discouraged from participating if it
observes a high level of publicity because this signals that competition in the auction
will be ﬁerce: if the probability of recouping the participation cost is too low, the ﬁrm
might decide not to enter the competition.
In the paper we ﬁrst adapt the model of Menezes and Monteiro (2000) on endogenous
entry into auctions allowing for the optimal choice of publicity and show that it can be
the case that the optimal level of publicity is not the maximal one, even if publicity
comes for free to the auctioneer. That is: it might be the case that keeping the number
of potential bidders smaller than what it could be is an optimal policy, because of the
trade-oﬀ illustrated above. Next, we apply our econometric analysis to the database
collected by the Italian Authority for Surveillance of Public Procurement and using the
RDD method we disentangle the causal eﬀect of publicity on the number of bidders
and on the winning rebate. Our empirical analysis reports evidence of a positive and
statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of publicity on the number of bidders and on the winning
rebate when the level of publicity is increased from local to regional level (+50 % and
+31 % respectively). This result suggests that increasing the publicity level from local
to regional can yield considerable beneﬁts for the contracting authority, especially if
we consider that the cost of publishing at regional level is rather low in Italy. On the
other hand, no statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect is observed when publicity is increased from
regional to national level. It appears, thus, that this increased level of publicity is not
useful in attracting other potential bidders to the auction. A possible conclusion that
can be drawn from this result is that regional advertisement is already per se suﬃcient to
inform national dimensioned ﬁrms, and publishing at national level most likely causes an
additional (rather high) cost to the contracting authority without yielding any additional
beneﬁt. Finally, publicity is found to have a strong eﬀect on the winning rebate but not
on the number of bidders when it is increased from national to European level: +62 %.
We can interpret this result as a signal that publicity at European wide level has an
impact on the ﬁnal outcome of the auction which is determined not by the quantity of
the participating bidders but, likely, by the quality of the ﬁrms which are participating
the auction. Publishing on the Oﬃcial Journal of the European Community might then
be a way for the contracting authority to select eﬃcient European ﬁrms and ultimately
increase its rent.
The results described above are supported by the tests of the continuity conditions which
we perform both graphically and within the regression analysis’ framework.
We also report evidence of a negative correlation between competition and the time to
deliver the public good within a duration analysis framework. Indeed, a shift of the
number of bidders above the median determines an increase in the hazard of 12% and
Coviello, Decio (2009), Three Essays in Applied Economics 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/11959Chapter 2. Publicity, Potential, and Actual Competition 32
a shift of the winning rebate above the median determines an increase in the hazard
rate by 10%. These eﬀects are all signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The empirical analysis
thus suggests that, within the context of our data, increasing the level of publicity
has a positive eﬀect on public procurement outcomes. At this level of the analysis,
however, we cannot disentangle the positive eﬀect which is due just to the number of
potential competitors from several other eﬀects which publicity might have on the nature
of competition. Indeed, increasing the publicity level might determine a reduction in the
probability of collusion (simply because a ’maverick entry’ from outside becomes more
likely) or it might attract a particular kind of competitor which might induce local ﬁrms
to bid more aggressively. We plan to address that issue in further research.
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Appendicies
Testing for the presence of Sorting and Lack of Continuity
Conditions
As discussed in Section (2.5.1), the RDD identiﬁcation strategy is mainly based on the
validity of the continuity conditions, equations (2.3) and (2.4). In this application of
the RDD we have in mind the caveat that auctions’ starting value is not exogenously
determined and that the publicity thresholds are public knowledge. Strategic contracting
authorities may set auctions’ starting value just below the publicity thresholds. That
is, pro-local authorities that do not care of maximizing auctions’ revenues may have
incentives to strategically reduce the starting value below the discontinuity thresholds
in order not to publish the tenders and favor local entrepreneurs. Although we have
already discussed that this strategic splitting of the starting value is forbidden by the Law
on public procurement and we report graphical evidence of no sorting, we formally test
the possibility of such violations. We focus the statistical analysis following McCrary
(2007), and Lee (2007). Since the two methods are complementary we comment the
results based on the pre-treatment variables only.27 We estimate the same models as
in equation (2.9) but use as outcomes a set of pre-treatment variables. We extend
the graphical analysis of Section (2.5.2), increasing the available information on the
person in charge for the auction’s administrative process (age and gender) and on the
administrative nature of the contracting authority (Province and Municipality). In
Panel A of Table (2.6) the ﬁrst pre-treatment outcome that we consider is an indicator
of whether the person in charge is above the median distribution of age (52 years old).
If the estimates of the coeﬃcients on the actual publicity indicator using the theoretical
publicity as an instrument are statistically diﬀerent from zero, that would indicate that
there are systematic diﬀerences in the age of the profession of the person in charge
before and after the thresholds. This would suggest the possibility that in some of the
auctions there was selection around the thresholds and lack of continuity in the baseline
outcomes. The second indicator is whether the person is the gender of the person in
charge. In Panel B of Table (2.6) the ﬁrst pre-treatment outcome that we consider is
an indicator of whether the contracting authority is the Province and the second of
whether it is the municipality. In both Panel A and B we report estimates for the
entire sample and for the discontinuity 1 sample. Estimation results reports evidence
of no selection around the discontinuities. The intention-to-treat estimates in the ﬁrst
27The McCray (2007) density tests conﬁrm the analysis on the pre-treatment variables and are not
reported but available on request.
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column indicates that a one unit increase in the publicity level is associated with a
reduction of 0.0046 of the indicator of the median age of the person in charge. This
estimate is small and statistically not diﬀerent from zero. We ﬁnd signiﬁcant eﬀects for
the IV-LATE estimates in the ﬁfth and sixth columns of the table when we consider
the MEDIUM and the LARGE information set. The MEDIUM information set is the
same as for the regression for Table (2.5) and includes a third order polynomial in the
starting value and time indicators. The LARGE information set includes the MEDIUM
and indicators on the nature of the good (roads, culture, education) the administrative
nature of the contracting authority ( Municipality or Province), technical and ﬁnancial
characteristics required by the contracting authority to the bidders (RSOA, and OG, see
section (2.4)). We further enquire this issue by using other information on the person
in charge such as the gender.28 As in the ﬁrst row of Table (2.6), also in the other rows
each coeﬃcient comes from a separate regression. For example, the left cell of the row
corresponding to the gender of the person in charge indicates that an increase in the
amount of publicity increases the probability of being male of the person in charge by
0.002 and this estimate is small and statistically not diﬀerent from zero. The coeﬃcient
get smaller if we consider the same regression at discontinuity 1. This is exactly what
we should ﬁnd if our identiﬁcation strategy is correct and such conclusion is conﬁrmed
by the rest of the table. Moreover, all the estimates in Panel B indicate no systematic
diﬀerences with respect to the indicators of whether the contracting authority is the
Province or the Municipality. Estimation results allow us to exclude the existence of
sorting around the thresholds.
28We obtained this information from the ﬁscal code.






















































Figure 2.1: Publicity and Competition: Forces at Work
publicity￿ # of bidders￿ awarding rebate￿ +￿ ?￿
?￿
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Percentiles
mean sd p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 n
Number of Bidding Firms 32 35 3 9 21 44 77 41510
Winning Rebate 16 8.9 4.7 10 15 21 29 41510
Notice Board .92 .27 1 1 1 1 1 41510
Regional Oﬃcial Journal .25 .43 0 0 0 1 1 41510
Italian Oﬃcial Journal .18 .39 0 0 0 0 1 41510
Number of Province Newspapers .24 .72 0 0 0 0 1 41510
Number of Regional Newspapers .42 .81 0 0 0 0 2 41510
Number of National Newspapers .61 .92 0 0 0 1 2 41510
Starting Value (in 100000 Euro) 7.2 12 1.8 2.2 3.6 7 15 41510
Technical Requirements: Buildings .13 .34 0 0 0 0 1 41510
Required Category at least 3 .29 .45 0 0 0 1 1 41510
The contractor is a Municipality .52 .5 0 0 1 1 1 41510
The contractor is a Province .12 .33 0 0 0 0 1 41510
The contractor is in the North .45 .5 0 0 0 1 1 41510
The contractor is in the Center .25 .43 0 0 0 0 1 41510
The contractor is in the South .22 .42 0 0 0 0 1 41510
Source: Statistics for all the public procurements works tendered between 2000 and 2005.
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Typology Roads Education Culture Others
Number of Bidding Firms 46 23.5 20.4 28.1
Winning Rebate 16.6 15.3 14.1 16.2
Notice Board .935 .953 .948 .9
Regional Oﬃcial Journal .229 .261 .274 .261
Italian Oﬃcial Journal .144 .161 .181 .204
Number of Province Newspapers .252 .228 .236 .234
Number of Regional Newspapers .407 .341 .422 .432
Number of National Newspapers .545 .635 .604 .633
Starting Value (in 100000 euro) 6.33 6.95 7.5 7.47
Technical Requirements: Buildings .0146 .271 .204 .164
Required Category at least 3 .271 .269 .302 .294
The contractor is a Municipality .5 .608 .774 .459
The contractor is a Province .208 .269 .0445 .0542
The contractor is in the North .437 .499 .461 .432
The contractor is in the Center .237 .246 .327 .242
The contractor is in the South .243 .191 .169 .235
Fraction of the total 30.6 10.9 7.09 43.1
Source: Statistics for all the public procurements works tendered between 2000 and 2005.
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Table 2.3: Advertisement: Rules and Costs
Starting Value Theoretical Costs Non-Compliance
y Publicity of publishing to the Law
(in 100000 euro) (in euro) (%)
EU-Oﬃcial Journal (GUCE) Free
Italian Oﬃcial Journal (GURI) 7000-8000
y ≥ 65.5 National Newspapers (at least 2) 800 10
Regional Newspapers (at least 2) 600
Italian Oﬃcial Journal (GURI) 7000-8000
10 ≤ y < 65.5 National Newspapers (at least 2) 800 22.5
Regional Newspapers (at least 2) 600
Regional Oﬃcial Journal (BUR) 200-500
5 ≤ y < 10 Provincial Newspapers (at least 2) 400 28.9
y < 5 Notice Board Free 6.5
Note: In the table y represent the starting value of the auction. To compute the third threshold
we considered 65.5 as the value of 5,000,000 of SDR in EURO 2000. The cost average of regional
oﬃcial journals, and of the regional, and provincial newspapers are regional and provincial
averages.
Source: Law 109/1994 and Authors’ interviews with national advertisement companies.


















1.5 5 10 65.5
Euro (in 100000)
Actual Publicity Theoretical Publicity
Source: Theoretical publicity and actual publicity (aggregate average) for all the public procure-
ments works tendered between 2000 and 2005.
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Table 2.4: Descriptive Statistics of the Characteristics of the
Object Around Discontinuity One
Panel A:
Characteristics Roads Education Culture Municipality Province
Before Disc.1 0.31 0.11 0.07 0.53 0.11
(sd) 0.46 0.31 0.26 0.50 0.31
After Disc.1 0.30 0.11 0.08 0.50 0.12
(sd) 0.46 0.31 0.27 0.50 0.33
Total 0.30 0.11 0.07 0.52 0.12
(sd) 0.46 0.31 0.26 0.50 0.32
Panel B:
Characteristics North Centre South Tec.Req.: Req. Cat.
Buildings at least 3
Before Disc.1 0.45 0.25 0.23 0.14 0.05
(sd) 0.50 0.43 0.42 0.34 0.22
After Disc.1 0.47 0.24 0.21 0.13 0.51
(sd) 0.50 0.43 0.41 0.33 0.50
Total 0.46 0.24 0.22 0.13 0.26
(sd) 0.50 0.43 0.41 0.34 0.44
Source: Statistics for all the public procurements works tendered between 2000-2005.
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Source: Statistics for all the public procurements works tendered between 2000 and 2005 in the discontinuity sample.
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Source: Statistics for all the “Roads and Construction” tendered in year 2000.
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Source: Statistics for all the “Roads and Construction” tendered in year 2000 around Discontinuity 1.
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Source: Statistics for all the public procurements works tendered between 2000 and 2005 in the discontinuity sample.
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Table 2.5: Discontinuity Estimates of the Eﬀect of Publicity on Compe-
tition
Method OLS-ITT OLS-ITT OLS IV-LATE N. of Obs.
Dep.Var Publicity Auction’s Auction’s Auction’s
outcome outcome outcome
Treatment Theo.Publ. Theo.Publ. Publicity Publicity
Instrument Theo.Publ.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Number of Bidders
Mean-Outcome . . 38 . . 17336
(sd) . . 35 . . .
Discontinuity 1 .2 3.1 . .93 19 11434
(se) .019 1.6 . .96 8.5 .
Discontinuity 2 .36 -4.6 . -3.5 -21 3528
(se) .069 3.7 . .9 11 .
Discontinuity 3 .65 -4.6 . .56 -6.4 2374
(se) .21 4 . .67 7.1 .
Panel B: Winning Rebate
Mean-Outcome . . 16 . . 17336
(sd) . . 8.7 . . .
Discontinuity 1 .2 .82 . -1 4.9 11434
(se) .019 .39 . .22 2.1 .
Discontinuity 2 .36 .81 . -1.1 3 3528
(se) .069 .65 . .17 2.1 .
Discontinuity 3 .65 6.1 . -.16 10 2374
(se) .21 1.6 . .18 3.8 .
Note: Each coeﬃcient (and standard error in parenthesis) is an estimate of β obtained from the
regressions of the form: Ci = g(yi) + βPi + δt + ωi where C is the actual level of publicity in
column 1 and: the number of bidders in Panel A, and the winning rebate in Panel B; P is the
theoretical publicity in columns 1 and 2, and the observed publicity in columns 3 and 4. g(yi)
is the third order polynomial in the starting value. Columns 1, 2 and 3 report OLS estimates:
column 4 IV using the theoretical publicity as instrument for observed publicity. δt are year
indicators.
Source: Statistics for all the public procurements works tendered between 2000 and 2005.






















































Table 2.6: Tests for the Presence of Sorting and for the Validity of the Continuity Conditions.
Method OLS-ITT OLS-ITT OLS OLS IV-LATE IV-LATE N N
Treatment Publicity Publicity Publicity Publicity
Instrument Theo.Publ. Theo.Publ. Theo.Publ. Theo.Publ.
Info. Set MEDIUM LARGE MEDIUM LARGE MEDIUM LARGE MEDIUM LARGE
Panel A: Information on the Person in Charge
Age above 52 -.0046 -.0045 .003 .0028 -.026 -.027 17336 17336
(se) .0029 .0032 .0016 .0016 .0084 .0097 . .
Full Sample . .
Male .0038 .0048 .01 .0088 .017 .022 17336 17336
(se) .0048 .0056 .0032 .0032 .015 .018 . .
Age above 52 .01 .0096 -.00024 -.0005 .019 .019 11434 11434
(se) .0069 .0069 .003 .0029 .031 .031 . .
Discontinuity 1 . .
Male -.0079 -.007 .015 .013 .0072 .012 11434 11434
(se) .014 .014 .0068 .0068 .07 .071 . .
Panel B: The Contracting Authority is
Province .0042 .0047 -.004 -.0021 .027 .024 17336 17336
(se) .0043 .0049 .0033 .0032 .015 .017 . .
Full Sample . .
Municipality -.028 -.025 -.073 -.068 -.021 -.023 17336 17336
(se) .0068 .0079 .0049 .0049 .022 .026 . .
Province .0039 .0023 .0062 .01 .039 .026 11434 11434
(se) .013 .013 .0081 .0078 .07 .068 . .
Discontinuity 1 . .
Municipality -.0092 -.0063 -.069 -.062 .055 .061 11434 11434
(se) .021 .021 .012 .012 .11 .11 . .
Note: Each coeﬃcient (and standard error in parenthesis) is an estimate of β obtained from the regressions of the form: Ki = g(Yi)+βPi +δt +ωi where
K is the pre-treatment outcome indicated in each row of column 1. P is the theoretical publicity in columns 1 and 2, and the observed publicity in columns
3 and 4. g(yi) is the third order polynomial in the starting value. Columns 1-4 report OLS estimates: column 4-6 IV using the theoretical publicity as
instrument for observed publicity. δt are year indicators. Columns 2, 4, 6 includes indicators on the nature of the good (roads, culture, education) the
administrative nature of the contracting authority (Municipality or Province), technical and ﬁnancial characteristics required by the contracting authority
to the bidders (RSOA, and OG) and 21 regional indicators. Statistics for all the public procurements works tendered between 2000 and 2005.
Coviello, Decio (2009), Three Essays in Applied Economics 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/11959Chapter 2. Publicity, Potential, and Actual Competition 46
Table 2.7: Sensitivity Analysis: Discontinuity Eﬀects of Publicity on the
Winning Rebate
Model Reduced 4th Order Reduced LARGE LARGE
sample polynomial sample + Info-Set Info-Set +
4th Order 4th Order
polynomial polynomial
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Discontinuity 1
OLS -.42 -1.1 -.43 -1.2 -1.2
(se) .3 .22 .3 .22 .22
IV 6.2 6.7 5.6 4 5.5
(se) 4.4 2.7 4.6 2.1 2.7
N 5983 11434 5983 11434 11434
Panel B: Discontinuity 2
OLS -1.3 -1.1 -1.3 -1 -1
(se) .28 .17 .28 .17 .17
IV 6.9 2.5 8 2.8 2.2
(se) 4.1 2 4.6 2.1 2.1
N 1495 3528 1495 3528 3528
Panel C: Discontinuity 3
OLS 1.8 -.18 1.6 -.093 -.1
(se) .65 .18 .65 .18 .18
IV 12 9.9 20 13 12
(se) 16 4.7 50 6.7 6.8
N 209 2374 209 2374 2374
Note: Each coeﬃcient (and robust standard error in parenthesis) is an estimate of β obtained from the
regressions of the form: Ri = g(Yi) + βPi + γXi + δt + ωi where R is the winning rebate and P is
the actual level of publicity, Xi a vector of observable characteristics and g(yi) is the polynomial in
the starting value. Odd rows report OLS while even rows IV-LATE estimates using the theoretical
publicity as instrument for observed publicity. δt are year indicators. In columns 4-5 the LARGE
info-set includes indicators on the nature of the good (roads, culture, education) the administrative
nature of the contracting authority (Municipality or Province), technical and ﬁnancial characteristics
required by the contracting authority to the bidders (RSOA, and OG). Statistics for all the public
procurements works tendered between 2000 and 2005.
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Table 2.8: Works’ Duration, Estimated Hazard Ratios from Cox-PH Models
Information Number Winning








Note: Each coeﬃcient (and standard error below) is an estimate of the β obtained from the regressions of the form: hi(t|x,β) =
h0(t)e(g(yi)+βCi+δXi) where hi is the hazard function (i.e. the instantaneous probability of accomplish the works at t given survival until t)
and h0 the baseline hazard. g(yi) is the third order polynomial in the starting value. The columns report the eﬀects considering separately the
2 proxies for competition (Ci). The MEDIUM information set includes as regressors the third order polynomial in the starting values. The
LARGE information set includes indicators on the nature of the good (roads, culture, education) the administrative nature of the contracting
authority (Municipality or Province), technical and ﬁnancial characteristics required by the contracting authority to the bidders (RSOA, and
OG) and 21 regional indicators.
Source: Statistics for all the public procurements works tendered between 2000 and 2005.








In this paper we investigate the relationship between the time politicians
remain in power and the functioning of public procurement auctions. To this
purpose, we use a dataset on the Italian municipal governments and all the
public tenders they administered between 2000 and 2005. Identiﬁcation is
obtained through the introduction of a two-term limit in March 1993: since
the reform was not retroactive, mayors appointed right before the imple-
mentation could be potentially re-elected for two additional terms, while the
others for one only. Assuming no manipulation of election timing, we use the
year of election (before or after 1993) as an instrument for the accumulated
longevity in oﬃce. Our primary ﬁnding is that political longevity deterio-
rates public spending. In fact, it decreases the number of bidders and the
winning rebate, while it increases the probability of renegotiating the terms
of the contract in favor of the winning ﬁrm. We interpret these ﬁgures as
evidence that leaving politicians in oﬃce longer increases their probability
of collusion with local ﬁrms. Accordingly, we also ﬁnd that the eﬀect of
political longevity is weaker at higher levels of government (i.e., provincial
authorities), where it is more diﬃcult to establish personal connections.
3.1 Introduction
Political authorities commonly use public contracting to realize works in outsourcing1,
the objective for the contractor being the minimization of public expenditure under
1It has been estimated that the average total expenditure for government procurement, less compen-
sation and defence, accounts for the 7.57 % of the GDP of OECD Members (Audet, 2002).
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the provision of a certain quality. However, the miss-practice of using public contracts
to strategically allocate public funds to interest groups is widespread, and it renders
public contracts a powerful tool for incumbent politicians to consolidate their political
consensus through favoritism, and eventually to get bribes.
While there is evidence that political connections drive the allocation of procurement
contracts (Goldman, Rocholl and So, 2008a), even in the case this is done through pub-
lic tenders e.g. competitive procurement auctions, (Hyytinen, Lundberg, and Toivanen,
2007), little is known, however, about their process of making over time.2 If it takes
time for bidders to establish a preferential relationship with the political authority, a
periodic replacement of the person who is in charge for the assignment might indeed
break collusion, thus improving the eﬃciency of auction mechanisms. If instead con-
nections could be instantaneously build up at the beginning of each electoral term, or
if candidates already have established acquaintances at the time of election, one should
observe no eﬀect of political longevity on the level of collusion. Other than collusion,
there might also be a process of skills accumulation through which politicians learn
how to design and administrate the procurement mechanism, and ﬁnally improve public
spending. Whether there is an eﬀect of political longevity over the functioning of public
procurement remains, therefore, an empirical question.
In this paper we address this question using a dataset on the Italian mayoral terms,
and all the public procurement auctions they administered between 2000 and 2005.
The institutional framework is particularly suited for the analysis because all municipal
procurement auctions are sealed-bid, which reduces the possibility of complex strategic
behaviors, and single-attribute (price only), which instead simpliﬁes the identiﬁcation
of deceitful behaviors. For identiﬁcation purposes, we exploit the introduction of a two-
term limit in 1993. Since the term-limit applied to the terms elected after 1993, mayors
appointed right before could be then reelected for two additional terms, while those
elected after 1993 for one only. Under the assumption that the timing of election could
not be manipulated, but it was the result of an historical and idiosyncratic scheduling,
we use the year of election (before or after 1993) as an instrument for the time spent in
oﬃce, and analyze the impact on a series of outcomes characterizing the functioning of
public tenders.
To correct for the simultaneous implementation of another reform –the introduction
of the mayor’s direct election– that might have aﬀected the quality of the treated and
2More generally, there is a wide empirical evidence showing that political connections bust ﬁrms’
performance (Cingano and Pinotti, 2009 in an application to Italy; Dombrovsky, 2008; Faccio, 2006;
Ferguson and Voth, 2008; Fisman, 2001; Goldman, Rocholl and So, 2007b), and that politicians beneﬁt
from control over ﬁrms (Sukhtankar, 2008).
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the control group diﬀerently, we further implement a fuzzy Regression Discontinuity
Design (Card and Lee, 2008): while the term limit applied sharply after the reform,
the introduction of individual-ballot elections was instead more resilient, because of
the initial diﬃculty for parties to recruit candidates more suitable to the new electoral
system. If so, focusing on elections right before and after the 1993 reform will remove
any additional bias due to the diﬀerent selection mechanism for the treated and the
control group.
The main results show that when the same politician remains in power for a long
period, there is a progressive reduction in the number of bidders participating in the
auctions (between -5.4% and -14.8% for each additional term in oﬃce) and, more im-
portantly, a reduction in the price at which the auction is assigned (between -1.7.%
and -4.3%), although the last result is not always statistically signiﬁcant. At the same
time, we also ﬁnd that having the same mayor in power for another term almost doubles
the probability that there will be a disadvantageous renegotiation of the work, both in
terms of delaying the delivery and in terms of the ﬁnal cost incurred by the contracting
authority. We interpret these ﬁgures as evidence that longevity, as opposed to political
turnover, comes with an increasing collusion between the incumbent mayor and some of
the bidding ﬁrms.
Since the 1993 reform also applied to the provincial governments (the administrative
level just above the municipalities), we ﬁnally investigate whether the eﬀect of political
longevity depends on the government level at which auctions are administered. We ﬁnd
that, contrarily to municipalities, when the tenders are held at province level political
longevity has a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on both the number of bidders and the
winning rebate. These ﬁndings are in line with the conjecture that the most corrupt
governments seem to be at the local level, where governments are often under the control
of narrow elites that use it for personal gain (Rose-Ackerman, 1999).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we review the related
literature and outline the theoretical background that we will use to interpret the data.
In Section 3.3, we describe the details of the estimation strategy. In section 3.4, we
describe the Italian institutional framework. In Section 3.5 we explain the data. In
Section 3.6, we present the results. We conclude with Section 3.7.
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3.2 Background and conceptual framework
3.2.1 Related literature
The empirical literature on corruption recently moved to consider direct measures of
shadow behaviors, like the unlawful administration of public goods or the amount
of bribes, rather then subjective opinion surveys.3 Examples include Bandiera et al.
(2008), Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2003), and Ferraz and Finan (2008). In particular,
Bandiera et al. (2008) study the introduction in Italy of a centralized purchasing au-
thority (Consip) and ﬁnd that the waste of public funds is mostly generated by red tape
rather then bribes; and that there are sizeable cost reductions in centralizing the pur-
chase of standardized goods because providers compete in an environment with higher
potential competition. Interestingly, Ferraz and Finan (2008) consider random audits
of local governments together with the two-term limit rule to identify the causal eﬀects
of lack of accountability on corruption.
Within this framework, our paper closely relates to recent studies on the relationship
between political stability and corruption. Among the others, Gamboa-Cavazos et al.
(2008) use ﬁrm-level data for Mexico on extra-oﬃcial payments made by ﬁrms to show
that the political clout exerted on a state government aﬀects corruption in a non-linear
manner. Speciﬁcally, they ﬁnd that corruption is more intense over long and short
political horizons, and less intense over intermediate ones, because of a combination of
“horizon” and “capture” eﬀects. Similarly, Campante et al. (2008) use cross-country
data and ﬁnd a U-shaped relationship between corruption and political stability, while
Besley and Prat (2004) ﬁnd a positive and linear correlation between political longevity
and several measure of corruption.
More broadly, there is an increasing interest in analyzing the way political compe-
tition aﬀects economic outcomes. Some authors argue that the lack of political compe-
tition may lead to policies that hinder economic growth, this because dominant parties
have less incentives to appeal to swing voters, who are not committed to one party and
are prepared to vote against candidates pursuing distorted policies (Besley, Persson and
Sturm, 2007; Polo, 1998). Others have argued instead that as far as political leaders
are constrained by the threat of entry, regimes with no challengers may nonetheless
implement policies in the public interest and carry out long-term reforms without the
need to please small but pivotal interest groups (Mulligan and Tsui, 2008).
At theoretical level, we borrow from a wide literature which analyzes the way the
principal can manipulate an auction to favor one of the bidders in exchange for a bribe.
3See Rose-Ackerman (1999) for the early studies.
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Some authors have emphasized the importance of speciﬁc weighting rules to help reduc-
ing the importance of manipulative attributes (Laﬀont and Tirole, 1991; Burguet and
Che, 2004). However, Compte, Lambert-Mogiliansky and Verdier (2005) show that, even
in the case of single-attribute sealed-bid procurement auctions, bureaucrats may still
provide an opportunity for bid readjustments, in which case a tighter control is the only
solution.4 Our paper also relates to the recent applied literature that analyzes the pro-
curement of construction contracts and contractual adjustments. Examples are Guasch,
Laﬀont, and Straub (2008) where they examine the ex-post contractual renegotiations
of procurement contracts for utility concessions in a group of Latin American countries.
Bajari and Tadelis (2001) and (2006), Bajari, McMillan and Tadelis (2008) and Bajari
and Lewis (2009) examine both theoretically and empirically the procurement of con-
struction contracts and argue that procurement contracts are often incomplete because
the initial plans and speciﬁcations are changed and reﬁned after the contract is awarded
resulting in a ﬁnal cost that may involve signiﬁcant renegotiation costs. In general, these
analyses ignore the fact that the bidders in these auctions might have a preferential re-
lationship with the auctioneer and collusion can leave room for some degree of ex-post
adjustment of the awarded contract. On this line, Engel et al. (2006) consider a model
where the auctioneer is also an elected politician, within a framework where the ex-post
renegotiations of the concession contracts, awarded through competitive public tenders,
are used as a tool of the political incumbent to increase the probability of winning the
upcoming election.
Compared to this literature, the contribution of our paper is twofold. First, we
use the introduction of the two-term limit rule to bring new empirical evidence on the
causal link between the political longevity, which may be seen as one realization of lack
of competition, and the way public procurement auctions are administered. Second, we
highlight a new mechanism to mitigate favoritism, i.e., the political turnover.
3.2.2 Conceptual framework
In this section we outline a stylized mechanism through which political longevity can re-
duce the competitive tension within procurement auctions. We conjecture some testable
predictions without formalizing an auction model, and interpret the estimation results
withdrawing from both the empirical industrial organization and the practical auction
design literature. In the spirit of Klemperer (2002), we will assume that what really
4Another strand of literature has focused instead of the collusion among bidders (the so called bidding
rings). Among the others, Robinson (1985), Graham and Marshall (1987), and McAfee and McMillian
(1992).
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matters in auction design are the standard tools generally used to spur competition.
That is, in auctions with lower entry barriers there is less collusion, more competition,
and consequently the price payed by the contracting authority is lower. In what fol-
lows, we assume that entry is a costly activity, as there are large bureaucratic bidding
preparation costs, and that the auction game can be severely biased by the presence of
systematic ex-post deviations from the awarding price, e.g. monetary and time renego-
tiations, approved by an auctioneer that wants to favor just some speciﬁc bidders. The
possibility of renegotiations favors some ﬁrms, the insiders, that can bid more aggres-
sively below their marginal costs, and win the auction with a probability that is higher
than the one of equally competitive outsiders that will ﬁnally not show up in the auction
as they will waste the bidding preparation and participation costs. Potential bidders,
after solving a proﬁt maximization problem and knowing the probability distribution of
others’ valuations, decide whether to take part in the auction if their expected proﬁts
are above the endogenous entry threshold and how much to bid. We argue that when
a new mayor is elected there are no or few political connections and every bidder faces
the same ex-ante probability of renegotiations. For this reason, the number of bidders
is high and competitive pressure rises the ﬁnal rebate.
Throughout the term, political connections are formed, which are not reversible and
grow until they reach an upper bound as collusion between politicians and bidders is
illegal. The probability distribution of political connections is not common knowledge,
but bidders infer about it by looking at both the outcomes of each auction and the iden-
tity of the winning bidder that are public knowledge. When a bidder is drawn, he or
she will pay a bribe to the mayor in exchange for a higher renegotiation probability. For
the same reason, those who are not drawn will update downward their expected rene-
gotiation probability and thus increase their entry threshold. In this way, by the end of
the ﬁrst term all political connections are revealed: only connected bidders participate
in the auctions, rebates are lower because of the reduction in the competitive pressure,
and the probability of renegotiation is higher as are used to increase entry barriers. If
the mayor is reelected for a second term, unlucky bidders leave the stage to connected
bidders only.5 If instead the mayor is not reelected, political connections are reset and
competition in public contracting follows the same pattern as before. One important
alternative to the outlined framework regards the process of making of political con-
nections. If, instead of growing over time, all connections were instantaneously formed
at the beginning of each term (or, alternatively, if every candidate already had a set of
5We assume that colluded bidders cannot inﬂuence electoral voting, such that the outcome of elections
is orthogonal to favoritism in public procurement.
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connections at the time of election), we should not observe any change in the outcome of
public procurement auctions. This is because bidders know that if they are not drawn
ﬁrst, they will never have the chance of being assigned an auction. This stylized model
deliver the following two alternative hypotheses for the eﬀect of a change in the mayor
on public procurement auctions:
Hypothesis 1: If the process of making political connections is slow, we should ob-
serve a reduction in competition, an increase in the winning rebate, and a higher
probability of renegotiation followed as far as political longevity increases.
Hypothesis 2: If the process of making political connections is instantaneous, we
should observe no eﬀect on competition, on the winning rebate, and on the prob-
ability of renegotiation as far as political longevity increases.
An alternative hypothesis is that there might also be a learning process on the
part of mayors. Abstracting from possible collusive behaviors, mayors might acquire
skills, through practice, and learn how better design and administrate the procurement
auctions, attract more and eﬃcient bidders, and ﬁnally improve public spending. Along
this line, Dal B´ o and Rossi (2008) exploit a natural experiment in the Argentine House
of Representatives where term lengths were assigned randomly and reporot evidence
that that longer terms enhance legislative productivity in the Argentinian Parliament, as
measured by attendance, committee activity, and the number of legislative achievements,
while Padr´ o i Miquel and Snyder (2006) ﬁnd that productivity, as measured by surveying
legislators, lobbyists, and journalists in North Carolina about the eﬀectiveness of the
members of the House of Representatives, rises sharply with tenure. Recently, Conconi
et al. (2009), ﬁnd that in the U.S. Congress trade liberalization reforms are more
easily undertaken when politicians serve longer terms and explain it by considering
the possible divergence between the political and the reform horizons. Adapted to the
case of procurement auctions, It is easy to think of a new mayor who does not have any
expertise in public procurement and, after election, could only endure previous practices.
However, if really motivated in reducing public spending and gain electoral consensus,
he or she might soon take control of the procurement process and learn how to improve
the overall eﬃciency of the procurement contract using eﬃciently the procurement law.
For instance, Coviello and Mariniello (2008) in the same framework of public works in
Italy, report evidence that contracting authorities that strictly comply with the public
procurement law and advertise public tenders, thus are open to a large set of potential
competitors, beneﬁt from higher actual competition-i.e. more bidding ﬁrms- and of
a reduction in the ﬁnal prices payed by the contracting authorities after taking into
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account the extra costs of advertisement. If this is the case, we could then formulate
another hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: If the process of skills accumulation prevails over the process of making
connections, we should observe a higher competition, a reduction in the winning
rebate, and a lower probability of renegotiation as far as political longevity in-
creases.
Finally, we form our three testable hypothesis within an auction framework where
an overall reduction of entry barriers, by reducing bidders’ entry costs, increases actual
entry and consequently stimulate a ﬁerce price competition. This relation is theoreti-
cally not unquestioned and should be interpreted with a careful consideration of both
the mechanism behind the auction in consideration and the regularities displayed in the
data. In our sample, we report evidence of a positive correlation between the number
of bidders and the winning rebate which is typical of competitive auctions. We use
this fact to contrast the theoretical ﬁndings of a recent paper that analyzes the italian
case and to support our hypothesis.6 More in general, both the sophistication of the
averaged-average selection mechanism and the empirical ﬁndings allow us to reject the
main predictions of average bid models.7 The sizable correlations between the number
of bidders and the winning rebate, that range from 0.35 to 0.44 and are statistically
diﬀerent from zero, are suggestive of a competitive component left in the averaged-
average method.8 Even if the italian selection mechanism that rewards only bidders
getting closer to the averaged-average from below and excludes from competition the
ones above it, is neither a ﬁrst price nor a pure average bid method auction we frame
our hypothesis within a framework that, in presence of both collusion between the auc-
tioneer and the bidders and among bidders, leaves some competitive pressure. Given the
uniqueness of the Italian mechanism a formal proof of the equilibrium properties of the
selection mechanism goes beyond the scope of this paper and leave it for further research.
6See Lemma 2 and 3 and footnote 38, at pg. 20-22 of Decarolis (2008). In this paper under the
Independent Private Value assumption, it is showed that as the number of bidders grows asymptotically
all the symmetric Bayesian Nash Equilibria converge toward the minimum evaluations of the bidders.
Similarly under the pure Common Value assumption it is argued that, in equilibrium, no matter what
is the number of bidders, all the players will bid a constant c that will be bounded between zero and y,
the common value of the bidders. Under both assumptions the average bid model predicts a negative
(or zero asymptotically) correlation between the number of bidders and the winning rebate.
7We leave for Section 3.4 a detailed description of the institutional set-up.
8These estimates are not reported but available on request.
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In what comes next, we describe the identiﬁcation strategy that will allow us to
bring these alternative hypotheses to the data.
3.3 Identiﬁcation Strategy
We want to estimate whether the time spent in oﬃce by the same mayor aﬀects the
outcome of the procurement auctions administered in the city. Assume that the outcome
of an auction i managed by a mayor m can be speciﬁed in the following linear form:
yim = α + βTim + δ1Xi + δ2Xm + νim, (3.1)
where yim is the outcome of the auction; Tim denotes the longevity in oﬃce of the mayor
at the time of the bids’ delivery; Xi is a vector of auction characteristics; Xm is a vector
of mayor, electoral, and city characteristics; and νim represents the disturbance term
composed by a mayor speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect ηm and ǫim the usual white noise random
component left from the model speciﬁcation. The coeﬃcient of interest is β. If the col-
lusion eﬀect, induced by the political longevity of the mayor dominates over the positive
skills acquisition eﬀect (or it does not apply because connections form instantaneously
after election), β should be estimated with a negative sign representing a systematic
deterioration of the functioning of the auctions administrated by long-lasting mayors.
An otherwise positive estimate of β will be interpreted as a predominance of the skill
acquisition eﬀect over the collusion eﬀect, thus suggesting that the political turnover
caused by the two-term limit may be ineﬃcient.
We specify four diﬀerent versions of Equation (3.1) to control for four possible sources
of observable heterogenenity. The most parsimonious model (M1) includes the resident
population in the municipality as of 2000 to proxy for the size of the construction sector9,
a full set of ﬁxed eﬀect for all the 104 provinces to control for time invariant characteristic
of the local market, an indicator for the judicial eﬃciency index at year-region level, the
budget percentage deﬁcit over total revenues, and a set of indicators for the year of the
delivery of the bid to control for possible time eﬀects. Model two (M2), adds the set
of observable characteristics of the auctioned good to the covariates of M1, including
a second order polynomial of the starting value of the auction (i.e., the reservation
price of the contracting authority) in 100 thousands euros and 2000 equivalents, three
selection mechanism dummies, and ﬁve object dummies. Model three (M3), adds to M2
9The resident population is a proxy for the number of potential competitors and a preliminary way
to control for size eﬀects. We are currently collecting information at municipality level on the number
of ﬁrms certiﬁed to compete in procurement auctions.
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the observable characteristics of the mayors (gender, age, four education dummies, four
previous occupation dummies, whether the mayor was born in the city), while model four
(M4), ﬁnally adds electoral characteristics, i.e., whether the mayor faces a term limit,
the number of parties in the mayor’s coalition, four dummies for the mayor’s party, the
longevity in power of the mayor’s party in years, and a second order polynomial of the
time from the next scheduled election to capture electoral cycles. We will comment
estimated coeﬃcients only for this fully speciﬁed model.
Models M1-M4 represent one possible way to control for observable heterogeneity.
One generally adopted alternative is to exploit the longitudinal structure of our database
that contain repeated observation-i.e. several auctions- for each mayor and report a ﬁxed
eﬀect analysis. In the presence of enough within-mayor variability and time invariant
unobservables factors determining both the outcomes of the auctions and the political
longevity, the ﬁxed eﬀect estimator is a powerful solution for the omission of any auction-
invariant characteristic like the propensity to collude of each mayor. Unfortunately, our
database displays a within-mayor variation smaller than the between-mayor variation in
the political longevity indicator, the main variable of interest. It is well known that any
within-mayor analysis, like the ﬁxed-eﬀect, by exploiting this low within-mayor variation
delivers un-precise estimates. Hence, we opted to perform a fully cross-sectional analysis
and to ﬁnd an exogenous variation in political longevity orthogonal to the unobservable
omitted factors determining both political longevity and the outcome of the auctions.
3.3.1 Instrumental Variables
In this section we address the possible endogeneity of political longevity (Tim). More
colluded mayors, in fact, might be able to manage re-election more easily, if the lack of
competition induced by pro-collusive behaviors between auctioneers and bidders helps
politicians to be re-elected. Conversely, colluded mayors might have hard time to get
reelected if voters punish their unlawful or ineﬃcient behavior in the ballot. The same
argument applies if experience, rather than collusion, was the main determinant for both
reelection and auctions’ functioning.
To deal with this potential problem, we exploit the electoral reform that took place
in 1993 and argue that it induced an exogenous variation in the political longevity of a
particular group of mayors.
In March 1993 the Italian Parliament approved a wide reform of local administra-
tions, Municipalities and Provinces, in response to the 1990-1992 political crisis gener-
ated by the harshest judicial campaign “Mani Pulite”10, that for the ﬁrst time started a
10The activism of the pool of Judges of Milan which started the ﬁrst strong campaign to break
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dramatic investigation on the corruption of local administrators in the management of
public tenders. This reform, among other things, introduced a new electoral system that
constrained the number of new terms a mayor could stay in oﬃce to a maximum of two,
leaving out the previous ones. The reform also aimed at increasing the participation
of citizens in the selection of local administrators and introduced a voting system that
allowed voters to directly elect mayors or presidents of the province-i.e. the individual
ballot system. The new electoral system remained substantially unchanged until 2005,
constrained the political horizon of newly elected mayors, and was implemented with
non-retroactive eﬀects.11
Interestingly, the introduction of the new rule in March 1993 was unexpected and
determined potentially two groups of mayors at the time in oﬃce. In Figure 3.2 we
graphically illustrate the potential eﬀects of the reform for the two groups of mayors.
The horizontal line represents the time line and reports the year of the reform, and the
period that we observe data on procurement auctions. The continuos lines denote the
terms already gained by the mayors around the reform, while the shadow lines the po-
tential terms the two groups of mayors can have. The ﬁgure shows that mayors elected
before 1993, the treatment group, had a potential political longevity of at most three
terms plus their 1993 cumulated tenure in oﬃce. Mayors elected after the 1993, the
control group, had a potential political longevity of at most two terms. We exploit this
diﬀerence in the maximum number of potential terms in oﬃce before and after the re-
form to identify the causal eﬀect of observed political longevity. Moreover, the limited
availability of public tenders data will force the analysis on politicians actually in oﬃce
between the period 2000-2005. Clearly, the political longevity observed during the period
2000-2005 depends partially on the distance from the elections at the date of the reform,
and partially on other unobservable phenomena (e.g. ability of the incumbent mayors to
be re-elected, local collusion, perverse incentives, left-censoring, or simply measurement
error) that can potentially be correlated with the unobservable components of the out-
come equation. We overcome the problem fully using the database on politicians that
covers the period 1985-2007, to trace back the political career of these politicians, and
use the extra theoretical longevity, determined by the random scheduling of the elections
in the neighborhood of the reform, as a predictor for the extra observed longevity. In
practice, we use the theoretical longevity within an instrumental variable framework to
identify the causal eﬀect of the exogenous variation in political longevity induced by the
collusion between politicians and ﬁrms in the construction sector leaded to a dissolution of the Christian
Democratic Party and at the end of the so called “First Republic”.
11In 2000, the duration of a legislative term was increased from four to ﬁve years.
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reform.12 Hence, if the reform was unexpected thus a valid instrument, then reporting
evidence that the mayors elected before March 1993 systematically beneﬁted from the
reform by being politically more longevous during the period of observation would be
enough to argue that the 1993 reform determined higher observed tenure for mayors in
oﬃce during the period 2000-2005.13 We validate this hypothesis, estimating by how
much the cumulated political longevity of mayors in oﬃce between 2000-2005 can be
explained by the fact that they have been elected for the ﬁrst time before March 1993.
As a dependent variable of the ﬁrst-stage regression, Equation (3.2), we use the indicator
of longevity in power Tim and, as an exclusion restriction, an indicator of whether the
mayor was elected before March 1993, plus a full set of available regressors as speciﬁed
in model M4. The resulting ﬁrst stage equation is as follows:
Tim = a + bPRm + c1Xi + c2Xm + εim (3.2)
where, PRm indicates whether the date of the ﬁrst election was before March 1993, and
it is the excluded instrument in the Instrumental Variables (IV) estimation of Equation
(3.1). To test for instrument relevance, and rule out the possibility of biasing estimates
and conﬁdence intervals because of weak instruments, we compare the ﬁrst-stages F-
statistics of the excluded instrument using the rule of thumb of being greater than 10.
Instrument relevance is only one of the two requirements to conclude that the instru-
ment is good, and it is the testable one. The most diﬃcult requirement is the validity
of the exclusion restriction and its justiﬁcation. To argue that the instrument is valid
we need to discuss that the exclusion restriction is reasonable, and nothing eventually
related with the scheduling of the elections is left in the error term νim. In a theoret-
ical example, one may argue that more colluded politicians could have systematically
resigned their mandate before the natural termination of the term and set the new elec-
tions right before the reform, to get advantage of a potential extra term. We report
evidence of this possibility showing the frequency distribution of the time scheduling of
elections, and highlight the date of the reform. We follow a simpliﬁed Mc Crary (2008)
approach to graphically inspect the distribution of the timing of the election around
March 1993 and search for any suspicious density accumulation-i.e. jumps- that can
inform on some strategic anticipation of elections right before the reform. Finally, we
selected the control group by considering mayors with a previous election between March
1993 but not after march 1997, such that the control group during the period 2000-2005
12Vella (1993) shows that this simple two stages least squares estimator is helpful to solve the problems
generated by a censored endogenous regressor and consistently estimate the parameter of interest.
13We also performed the analysis considering the subsample of mayors elected for the ﬁrst time around
March 1993 and ﬁnd the same results.
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is formed by mayors that have been re-elected at least once after the introduction of the
term-limit.
Other estimation strategies could be implemented. For example, in a related prob-
lem Ferraz and Finan (2008) in the spirit of Lee, Moretti and Butler (2004), use of close
races where an incumbent looses or wins by a small margin to instrument the proba-
bility of the same mayor remaining in oﬃce for one additional term. However, within
this alternative framework we would not be able to separately identify the eﬀect of an
additional term in oﬃce from the eﬀect of the term limit.
3.3.2 Threats to validity
Another possible threat to the validity of the exclusion restriction, and thus of the iden-
tiﬁcation, comes from the multi-dimensional nature of the 1993 reform. In addition
to the term limit, the reform also changed the electoral system from party-ballot to
individual-ballot.14 After the reform, citizens were called to directly express their pref-
erence for the mayor. If so, within the new electoral framework, political parties may
face diﬀerent incentives in the selection of candidates and choose, for example, the ones
that maximize the probability of winning the elections rather then just selecting the
best candidate.
It is not obvious, however, which was the eﬀect of the change in the electoral system
on the selection of potential mayors at local level. On one side, the new individual ballot
system may have lead to a selection of better candidates, as opposed to the party ballot,
because citizens had now more chances to value the true quality of candidates. On the
other side, if most of citizens were either ideological (i.e., they follow a party rather
than a person) or non perfectly informed, the change in the electoral system would not
have had any eﬀect on the quality of the elected oﬃcials. No matter what was the
selection eﬀect of the new electoral system, one might realistically assume that, while
the term limit applied sharply after the reform, the introduction of individual-ballot
elections was instead more resilient, because of the initial diﬃculty for parties to recruit
candidates more suitable to the new electoral system. If so, focusing on elections right
before and after the 1993 reform will remove any additional bias due to the diﬀerent
selection mechanism for the treated and the control group.
We formalize this intuition within a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) Instru-
mental Variables approach (Van der Klaauw, 2008), which we will use to compare the
outcome of the auctions in the neighborhood of the March 1993 electoral threshold. In
particular we augment Equation (3.1) and (3.2) with a fully non parametric polynomial
14See Section 3.4.
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in the distance of bid delivery to the discontinuity threshold as follow:
yim = α + β1Tim + β2f(distm) + δ1Xi + δ2Xm + ǫim (3.3)
and,
Tim = a + b1PRm + b2g(distm) + c1Xi + c2Xm + νim (3.4)
where distm denotes the time distance, in months, of ﬁrst election from the 1993 reform,
and f(.) and g(.) are ﬂexible functions of it. Since the running variable is not continuous
(elections are held at speciﬁc points in time) we follow Card and Lee (2008) and specify
f(.) and g(.) as a series of time dummies and properly correct the standard errors for the
discreteness of the running variable. Under the assumption that there is no strategic
sorting around the discontinuity threshold, β1, from Equation (3.3) will be correctly
estimated with the same Instrumental Variables estimator discussed above.15
As discussed in Lee (2007), the IV-RDD framework allows to test for the validity of
the exclusion restrictions by considering a set of pre-intervention variables. These vari-
ables should meet the following two conditions: they should not be aﬀected by the March
1993 electoral reform, but they may depend on the same unobservable characteristics
(e.g. eﬃciency/collusion of mayors with participants), likely to aﬀect the functioning
of public procurement auction. To test this condition, also called the continuity condi-
tion, we reconstruct the information on both the characteristics and behaviors of mayors
elected around March 1993 and test for the statistical diﬀerence in the sample averages
across the treatment and the control group.
The tests for the balance of the observable characteristics of treatment and con-
trol mayors, together with the graphical evidence of no sorting around the March 1993
reform, are the tools to argue that the higher political longevity induced by the schedul-
ing of the elections is not related to any of the behaviors, observable characteristics of
politicians, auctions, and geographical locations that might aﬀect both the ability of
politicians to have longer tenure and the functioning of public procurement auctions. In
other words, they can provide support to the assumption that the electoral scheduling
was “random”, and thus can be used as a valid instrument for political longevity.
15Another possible concern with this estimation strategy is that mayor elected right after and right
before the reform might face a diﬀerent political horizon. While the concept of political horizon diﬀers
from that of political longevity (the ﬁrst one is the expectation of the time in oﬃce, while the second
one is the actual realization), one might think that our estimates are broadly capturing the eﬀect of a
mayor organizing its political activity over a longer period of time.
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3.4 The Italian institutional framework
In the Italian municipal administration (Comune) the executive authority is represented
by an elected Mayor (Sindaco), together with an Executive Committee (Giunta) which is
appointed by the mayor himself. They are assisted by a Council (Consiglio Comunale),
which is instead the legislative authority. In 1993 the mayoral electoral system was
changed from a party-ballot to an individual-ballot, with some diﬀerences depending on
the size of the city. Mayors are subject to a two-term limit, unless one of the two terms
lasted for less than two years. In 2000 the statutory duration of the legislature was
extended from four to ﬁve years. The functions of a municipal administration, besides
contracting for public works, include the provision of public transportation, some welfare
(like assistance to elderly people, nursery schools, and public housing), and managing
public utilities (like water, electricity, and gas).
During the period of observation, public tenders in Italy were administrated under
the Legge 109/94, and several amendments (“Merloni-bis, -ter’’, as they were called),
which regulated all the proceedings of the public procurement contracts. This set of
laws contain the details of how public contracts should be assigned, and speciﬁes the
requirements of public tenders, the awarding criterion, and the ex-post procedures in
case of non compliance to the original contract.
Speciﬁcally, public procurement auctions at municipal level are sealed-bid, and multi-
attribute or single-attribute depending on the size and the complexity of the public
work. For the sake of this exercise, during the period 2000-2005, we only observe single-
attribute auctions, i.e., auctions for which the technical component of the oﬀers plays
no role in the assignment, provided that the winner satisﬁes some minimum quality
standards which are set by the contracting authority. Firms bid within a time deadline
the price for which they are willing to do the works, in the form of a percentage reduction
(the rebate) with respect to the auction’s starting value. Notice, however, that the
winning rebate is not necessarily the highest bidden: in order to prevent ﬁrms from
over-bidding (i.e. bidding a price which does not allow to recoup works’ expenses) a
complex mechanism is implemented (see Figure 3.1). According to this rule, after a
preliminary mechanical trimming of the top (worst) 10 percent of the collected bids,
the bids which exceed from above the average bid by more than the average deviation,
are further excluded. Therefore, bidders have to guess this averaged-average “anomaly
thresholds”, trying to place a bid just below it.16 The fact that the work is assigned
16As for illustration, consider this simple example. In a hypothetical auction, after the trimming of
the tails there are three participants placing the following bids (rebates to the auction’s starting value):
10, 14 and 16. The average bid is thus 13.33. The average diﬀerence of the bids above this average bid
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to the bid which is the closest to the anomaly thresholds from below is particularly
important, because it guarantees some degree of competition among the bidders which
otherwise. This is not the case, for example, in other similar auction mechanisms like a
pure average bid auction, where the winning bid is the closest to the average no matter
whether from above or from below.17
Each auction is administered by a manager who is in charge of all the proceedings,
usually delegated by the mayor among the bureaucrats working in the technical oﬃce of
each city administration.18 He or she supervises the auction (coordinating the project,
the advertisement and the invitation of the ﬁrms when there are auctions on invitation),
administers the payments to the winning ﬁrm (upon initial approval of the city council),
and monitors the realization of the work. In particular, the participation mechanism
can be of three types: the Pubblico incanto, in which case the participation is open
to any ﬁrm satisfying the technical requirements that are function of the reserve price
of the auction; the Licitazione privata, in which case the contracting authority invites
a number of ﬁrms to participate, provided a minimum number is satisﬁed; and the
Trattativa privata, which is similar to the Licitazione privata except that the procedure
is faster and the minimum number of ﬁrms to be invited is reduced.19 Although the
law prescribes the general cases in which each speciﬁc auction format has to be used,
the municipal authority still retains large discretion in the ﬁnal tailoring of the auction
formats and requirements.
Finally, the law speciﬁes the cases in which the terms of the procurement contract
(the time of the work delivery, and the cost of the work) can be renegotiated. In
particular, renegotiations are admitted only in cases of unforeseen natural events (like
storms, earthquakes, landslides, etc.), and are conditional on approval by the auction
manager only. However, when the renegotiation implies an increase in the cost of the
work or a delay in the execution of the works, this does not need to be further approved
by the city council, i.e., it is not subject (like the initial installment) to the control of
the municipal council.20
is 1.12. Thus the anomaly thresholds is 14.44. It turns out that in this case the winning bid is 14, well
above the average, even if 16 percent is the highest bidden rebate.
17The properties of this awarding mechanism are not easy to prove and are beyond the scope outside
this paper. For a detailed discussion, see Albano et al. (2006) and Decarolis (2008).
18For large municipalities the coordinator of the technical oﬃce is appointed by the mayor.
19Other formats include the Licitazione privata sempliﬁcata, which is similar to the Licitazione privata,
and the Appalto concorso, which is used for works with a high architectural content staring from 300,000
euros.
20Engel et al. (2006) discuss the political economy of granting renegotiations in Latin America.
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3.5 The data
We use an administrative data set about all the Italian mayoral terms elected between
1985 and 2007, provided by the Italian Ministry of Interiors. The data set contains infor-
mation on the identity, gender, age, highest educational attainment, political aﬃliation,
and previous job of the elected mayor. It also contains information on the legislature,
such as the exact duration and the reasons of early termination, and the electoral re-
sults. Finally, we also have yearly information at municipality level about the size of the
resident population, total revenues expenditure, plus some demographic characteristics
as of 2005, like the disposable income per capita, the labor force participation rate, the
number of productive units per capita, the elderly index, and the population density
and the resident population at the 1991 census.
We combine the mayoral information with a data set about the public procurement
auctions, which is provided by the Italian Authority for Surveillance of Public Pro-
curement (“Autorit` a per la Vigilanza sui Lavori Pubblici”, AVLP), which collects data
on the universe of public procurement auctions in Italy for public works with starting
value greater or equal to 150,000 euros. For our analysis, we refer to the data collected
between 2000 and 2005. The data set includes information at auction level about the
number of bidding ﬁrms, the identity of the winning bidder, the typology of the works,
the bidding behavior, and two measures of the ex-post performance of the public con-
tracts: the extra time to accomplish the works, and the monetary renegotiation (if any)
of the winning rebates. Each procurement auction is assigned the information of the
mayoral term containing the date of bids delivery, although the realization of the public
work might then go beyond that term.
3.5.1 Descriptive Statistics
The initial sample consists of all the cities for which we observe at least one auction,
and without missing information.21 In Table 3.1 we present summary statistics for the
sample of municipalities over which we will run the estimation analysis.
The ﬁnal sample is made of 4,144 cities for which we have no missing information, 40
percent of which are located in the North-West of Italy, 20 percent in the North-East,
15 percent in the Center, 22 percent in the South and only 4 percent in the Islands.
The average municipality is relatively large, with almost 10,200 inhabitants (compared
to an national average of 7,015). The total number of observed terms is 5,504 (see
Table 3.2), for a total of 5,082 mayors. Only 8 percent of the mayors are women, the
21Of the 8,104 existing Italian municipalities, 4,506 had only one term overlapping between 2000 and
2005.
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average age is 50, the average political experience in the same city administration is
7.85 years, the average number of previous terms in oﬃce is 0.6 terms, 42 percent of
the mayors face a term limit, and only half of the mayors were born in the city they
administer. About 43 percent of the mayors have a college degree, while 44 percent have
a high-school degree and 11 percent a lower-secondary degree. Almost 12 percent where
not employed before being appointed, the majority being self-employed (41 percent),
followed by entrepreneurs (33 percent), blue collars (4 percent) and the rest being clerks.
Finally, 30 percent were elected with a center-left party, only 11 percent with a center-
right party, 3 with a separatist party and all the rest were in a center-wing or independent
party.
Note that these averages represent the mean value for the part of the term we observe.
Some terms, however, may be right or left censored depending on whether they overlap
with year 2000 or 2005, and this might introduce some measurement error. For the
estimation strategy to hold, we will have to further assume that, although diﬀerences
exists depending on whether the mayor can be reelected or not, there is homogeneity in
the way public procurement auctions are administered within a term.
3.5.2 Deﬁning the dependent variable
The data set contains a large number of measures that can help identifying the lack
of competition in public procurement auctions, its costs in term of public spending,
and, indirectly, to highlight the possible mechanisms linking the bidders to the political
authority. Following the natural life-cycle of any procurement contract, we divide these
characteristics in three sets: Tailoring, Auction-Game, and Ex-post Renegotiations.
The Tailoring vector includes an indicator for whether the selection mechanism of the
auction was with private invitation of a selected group of bidders. The Auction-Game
set includes measures of both the level and the nature of competition as the number
of bidders: the ﬁnal percentage rebate over the reserve price, whether the winning ﬁrm
is coming from the same municipality of the contracting authority, and the maximum
number of adjudications per term to the same ﬁrm, weighted by the average number of
adjudications. Finally, the Ex-post Renegotiations set includes an indicator of whether
the delivery of the public work crossed the original contractual deadline, and an indicator
for the price of the work payed by the authorities being raised after assignment, and the
amount of this renegotiation.
We are aware that some of these measures do not represent an exact indicator for
the lack of competition, or for the presence of collusion. For example, if bidders were
colluding among themselves, the fact that the number of bidders increases when a new
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mayor is elected would not necessarily be a signal of higher competition but just of
higher collusion. At the same time, since the reserve price is set endogenously by the
mayor (or the manager he or she had appointed), the ﬁnal rebate would not necessarily
capture the eﬀect of an increase in competition. However, as outlined in Section 3.2.2,
these measures, together with the choice of the auction format and with the probability
of renegotiation, can provide some interesting insights about the way political longevity
can aﬀect the functioning of public procurement contracts.
Table 3.3 describes the average characteristics of the auctions. The total number of
auctions we observe is 28,270. In 75 percent of the cases the selection criterion was the
public participation (Pubblico incanto), the average number of bidders was 23.41, with a
ﬁnal rebate of 13.21 percent. The majority of the public works concern the construction
of roads (23 percent), then schools (13 percent), public building (5 percent), public
housing (1 percent), art (4 percent). In 79 percent of the auctions the price set at the
time of the selection is then increased, and in 52 percent of the cases the contractual
deadline is delayed.22 Interestingly, the size of the public work tendered is quite small,
varies from 130,000 to 19,100,000 euros and with an average value of 546,000 euros.23
3.6 Results
In this section we report the graphical evidence of the analysis, then the main estimation
results on how political longevity aﬀects the functioning of public procurement contracts,
and discuss the evidence validating the assumptions required by the estimation method
we implement. All the estimates are computed at auction level, using the exact longevity
of the mayor at the time of the bid delivery, Tim.
In the graphical analysis we inspect the behavior of the number of bidders and the
winning rebate in the neighborhood of a turnover of the mayor. To begin with, In Figure
3.3 we plot the average number of bidders and the ﬁnal rebate by each year within the
term (6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 and 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 for the second and the ﬁrst term respectively),
separating mayors in their second term (and binding term limit) from the mayor who are
then elected for the ﬁrst term. Both panels of Figure 3.3 suggest a preliminary evidence
that, when a tenured mayor-i.e. the old mayor- is replaced by a new one, there is an
immediate increase in the average number of bidders participating in the procurement
auctions. This, in turn, translates into an increase in the average winning rebate. Inter-
22As discussed in Section 3.4, these ﬁgures are calculated for a limited number of regions that collected
the data on ex-post renegotiations.
23Values reported at 2000 equivalents.
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estingly, the same ﬁgure holds when we consider cases of political turnovers not induced
by the two term limit (see Figure 3.4).
In Tables 3.4 and 3.5 we move to present the baseline OLS estimates from ﬁtting
Equation (3.1) to the data for the four model speciﬁcations.24 In order to control for lo-
cal unobserved political, and institutional factors, we also include a set of province ﬁxed
eﬀects in all the speciﬁcations.25 Estimates conﬁrm the descriptive evidence: there is
a negative relationship between mayors’ longevity in oﬃce and the number of bidders
and the winning rebate in the public procurement auctions they administered. The
eﬀect appears to be both statistically and economically signiﬁcant. Depending on the
set of controls included in the regressions, an increase in one standard deviation in the
years of political longevity (3.9 years) is associated with a decrease in the number of
bidders by about 2.6-4.2 % with respect to the mean, and with a decrease in the ﬁ-
nal rebate by 2-3 %. Remarkably, the eﬀect of longevity on the number of bidders is
roughly two times bigger once the most generous model is speciﬁed (-.243). A back to
the envelop calculation suggests that public works systematically cost 22,000 euros more
in municipalities whit long-lasting mayors.26 Even if the OLS estimates include a very
large number of auction, mayor, and municipality observable characteristics, it is not
diﬃcult to imagine that the lack of competition induced by hidden collusive behaviors
between auctioneers and bidders might still help politicians to be re-elected, and then
bias severely the previous estimates. To take care of the potential endogeneity concerns,
we present evidence of the 2SLS identiﬁcation strategy discussed in Section 3.3, and
report the estimated coeﬃcients of the eﬀect of a shift in political longevity induced by
the March 1993 reform, on the three sets of outcomes described in Section 3.5.2.
Before presenting the 2SLS estimation results, we argue on the quality of our in-
strument. In in Section 3.3 we discussed the two requirements that an instrumental
variable, the indicator whether the mayor has been elected for the ﬁrst time before or
after the 1993, has to satisfy to be a good instrument. We ﬁrst report evidence on the
non-testable assumption that the election timing was orthogonal to the introduction
of the reform, by graphically inspecting, in a simpliﬁed Mc Crary (2008) fashion, the
frequency distribution of the elections around March 1993. Figure 3.5 plots on the hor-
izontal axis the time from January 1985 to January 2007, and on the vertical axis the
frequency of the elections. The ﬁgure highlights the main four election events of Italian
municipalities between the period 1999-2005, and generally supports the assumption
24See Section 3.3 for a detailed illustration of the models.
25On this spirit we follow the seminal work by Guiso et al. (2004) that reports evidence on the
eﬀectiveness of social capital and local institutions on economics activities.
26Calculations refer to public works with an average starting value of 548,267 euros.
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that elections were held with regular cycle, and with a timing determined by past events
only. To check more carefully whether there is some mass distribution of early resigna-
tions around March 1993 that might threaten the identiﬁcation strategy, we focus the
graphical inspection on the neighborhood of the reform. Figure 3.6 plots the frequency
of the elections between 1992 and 1994 only, and shows that there are actually a few
elections that were held right after the reform because of an early termination. However,
what is important to notice for the identiﬁcation strategy to hold is that the early termi-
nations did not serve the purpose of anticipating election to avoid the application of the
reform, but actually the opposite. Municipalities that experienced an early termination
went to election with the new electoral system, which is exactly what they would have
done even in case of natural termination.
As discussed in Section 3.3, another potential threat to the identiﬁcation of political
longevity using the 1993 reform comes from the multi-dimensionality of the reform itself,
which also introduced the individual-ballot election of the mayor. Mayors elected before
and after the reform could then diﬀer in their observable and unobservable characteristics
because of the diﬀerent selection process they went through. However, if the introduc-
tion of individual-ballot elections was somehow resilient, because of the initial diﬃculty
for parties to quickly recruit candidates more suitable to the new electoral system, we
should not observe signiﬁcant diﬀerences between mayors elected right before and after
the reform. In Table 3.6 we report the sample averages of mayors’ characteristics and
behaviors by treatment status around the 1993 reform. We consider three diﬀerent time
windows, and report p-values to test for the statistical diﬀerence of the following indi-
cators: gender, age, whether born in the city, whether employed at a high occupational
level, whether has a college degree, the budget deﬁcit of the municipality, and the resi-
dent population as reported in the 1991 Census. In Panel A, we report the diﬀerences
for a four years symmetric window (1989-1997): while we do not ﬁnd diﬀerences in the
characteristics of municipalities depending on the election scheduling, we do ﬁnd that
within the four years after the reform there were systematically more females, mayors
were less likely to be born in the city, they were more educated, skilled and with a lower
longevity then in the four years before the reform. Interestingly, in Panel B we reduce
the time window to two symmetric years (1991-1995), and almost all the diﬀerences are
no more statistically signiﬁcant (except for the budget deﬁcit that is higher after the
reform). Finally, when we restrict the time window to one year (1992-1994), all the
diﬀerences disappear. Importantly, the absence of any statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence
between the two groups of mayors does not seem to be driven by the small sample in
the one year window, as almost all the characteristics also equalize in terms of average
magnitude, which is not the case when we use a four years bandwidth. This evidence
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seems to be more compatible with a long-run increase in the quality of the new elected
mayors rather than a sharp change due to the 1993 reform. We thus include in any of our
speciﬁcations the year ﬁxed eﬀects to account for the presence of this trend. The ﬁrst
column in Table 3.7 presents the ﬁrst-stage estimates of the fuzzy-RDD model, where
we also included a set of two-years dummies for the distance between the delivery of the
bids and the 1993 reform. As expected, mayors elected before the reform accumulate, on
average, 3.3 years more in oﬃce (almost one term). The ﬁrst stage F-statistic suggests
that the instrument is relevant-i.e. there is not a weak instrument problem- and is much
larger than the usual rule of thumb of 10. In columns two and three of Table 3.7 we also
report the second-stage estimates for the fully speciﬁed model.27 We report evidence
that an exogenous increase in political longevity, induced by the 1993 reform, causes a
signiﬁcant decrease between 7 % and 4 % in the number of bidders, and a reduction in
the winning rebate, although the latter now is not statistically signiﬁcant. Interestingly,
the coeﬃcient on the size of the municipality is positive and statistically diﬀerent from
zero for both outcomes, suggesting that the bigger the potential market, the higher the
number of ﬁrms willing to compete. The coeﬃcient on the reserve price is also positive
and statistically diﬀerent from zero, the square term being instead negative: the bigger
the size of the public work the greater the willingness of potential bidders to enter, al-
though this trend is reverted when the size of the work is too high, probably because of
some production constraints. Finally, we report just a marginal evidence of a negative
and signiﬁcant eﬀect, at 10 %, of being in a term that is binding on the winning rebate,
while a strong and positive eﬀect on the number of bidders and the winning rebate on
the number of parties in the mayor’s coalition. Overall our fully speciﬁed model explains
33.1 % (53.1 %) of the total variability of the number of bidders (the winning rebate).
To what concern the potential economic mechanism behind the reduction in the
number of bidders, and consequently on the ﬁnal rebate, in Table 3.8 we do not detect
any increase in the discretion which is used to conduct public procurement (the use of
less market driven auction formats, i.e., the Trattativa privata), although mayors have
few degrees of freedom on this side (see Section 3.4). More interestingly, we report ev-
idence that the increase of 3.256 induced by the 1993 reform increases the probability
that there will be a later renegotiation of the terms of procurement, both in terms of
time and in terms of money by 25 % and 16 % respectively . As outlined in Section
3.2.2, this might be a way for mayors to compensate colluded ﬁrms which got assigned
the work because they were bidding more aggressively. We do not ﬁnd instead any sig-
niﬁcant evidence that, political longevity aﬀects the nature of competition as it is not
27See Section 3.3 for a detailed illustration of the models.
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changing the probability that the winners are coming from the same city.
We ﬁnally conclude in Table 3.9, where we merge the data set on municipalities with
a similar data set for the provincial governments (the administrative level just above the
municipalities), to which the same 1993 reform also applied.28 In this case we interact a
variable for the authority being a provincial government, rather than a municipality, in
order to detect any heterogeneity in the eﬀect of political longevity at diﬀerent admin-
istrative levels. Estimates suggest that the diﬀerence in the number of bidders and the
winning rebate is larger and statistically signiﬁcant for municipalities with long lasting
mayors compared to low tenure mayors, while in provinces the eﬀect is reverted. These
ﬁndings are in line with the conjecture that the most corrupt governments seem to be
at the local level, where governments are often under the control of narrow elites that
use it for personal gain (Rose-Ackerman, 1999).
3.7 Conclusions
In this paper we have shown that when politicians stay in power for too long, there
is deterioration in the functioning of the public procurement auctions they manage.
Speciﬁcally, there are less bidders participating in the auction, there is an increase in
the cost of the public work, and an increase in the probability that the contract will be
renegotiated, either in terms of costs or time to delivery. Accordingly, to previous studies
we also ﬁnd that the eﬀect of political longevity weakens at higher levels of government,
suggesting that it is more diﬃcult to establish personal connections once bidders are
competing in less de-localized environments. Our evidence is suggestive of a longevity
eﬀect in the process of diﬀusion of collusion between contracting authorities and bid-
ders. These results point out another channel trough which political collusion could be
eliminated and competition in public procurement restored, i.e., political turnover. This
was not highlighted in the previous literature. Of course, we are aware that political
turnover might have some drawbacks, especially when it creates instability and reduces
the incentive for politicians to implement long-run policies. However, at least for what
concerns the transparency of the policy making, institutional features like the term-limit
prove to be eﬀective in reducing collusion and helping to rationalize public spending at
local level.
28The data on provincial auctions lacks information about the budget deﬁcit and the number of parties
in the governing coalition, which were then excluded from the set of controls in the estimations.
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Tables and Figures
Table 3.1: City characteristics
Mean St.Dev. Min p25 p50 p75 Max N.
North-West .40 .49 0 0 0 1 1 4,144
North-East .20 .40 0 0 0 0 1 4,144
Center .14 .35 0 0 0 0 1 4,144
South .22 .42 0 0 0 0 1 4,144
Islands .04 .18 0 0 0 0 1 4,144
Population 10,197 56,642 49 1,579 3,595 8,034 2,733,908 4,144
Judicial eﬃciency 89.49 56.86 30.20 51.60 82.10 98.20 462.50 4,144
Notes. Population is the number of resident inhabitants as of 2000. Judicial eﬃciency is the ratio
(times 100) between settled and incoming cases, for each regional administrative court (TAR), for
public works related disputes.
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Table 3.2: Mayor/Term characteristics
Mean St.Dev. Min p25 p50 p75 Max N.
Female 0.08 0.27 0 0 0 0 1 5,504
Age 50.03 9.19 25.42 43.63 49.80 55.88 85.61 5,504
Born in the city 0.52 0.50 0 0 1 1 1 5,504
Municipal experience (years) 7.85 5.27 0.00 4.05 8.92 12.96 20.00 5,504
Previous terms in oﬃce (as mayor) 0.61 0.78 0 0 0 1 4 5,504
Previous years in oﬃce (as mayor) 5.32 3.99 0.00 2.27 4.72 7.37 20.09 5,504
Term limit binding 0.42 0.49 0 0 0 1 1 5,504
Education:
Lower secondary 0.11 0.31 0 0 0 0 1 5,504
Upper secondary 0.44 0.50 0 0 0 1 1 5,504
College 0.43 0.49 0 0 0 1 1 5,504
Employment:
Not employed 0.12 0.32 0 0 0 0 1 5,504
Self-employed 0.41 0.49 0 0 0 1 1 5,504
Entrepreneur 0.33 0.47 0 0 0 1 1 5,504
Clerk 0.05 0.21 0 0 0 0 1 5,504
Blue-collar 0.04 0.20 0 0 0 0 1 5,504
Political party:
Center-right 0.11 0.32 0 0 0 0 1 5,504
Center 0.06 0.23 0 0 0 0 1 5,504
Center-left 0.30 0.46 0 0 0 1 1 5,504
Separatist 0.03 0.18 0 0 0 0 1 5,504
Others 0.49 0.50 0 0 0 1 1 5,504
Coalition:
Parties in mayor’s coalition 1.31 0.98 1 1 1 1 13 5,504
Seats (%) in mayor’s coalition 68.53 8.35 57.57 66.67 66.67 66.67 100.00 4,923
Notes. Statistics on 5,082 mayors. Municipal experience in any oﬃce.
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Table 3.3: Auction characteristics
Mean St.Dev. Min p25 p50 p75 Max N.
Outcome:
N. bidders 23.41 27.61 0 5 14 32 550 28,270
Winning rebate (%) 13.21 8.68 0.00 6.90 12.50 17.44 49.99 28,270
Starting value 5.46 9.46 1.34 2.04 2.97 5.24 190.83 28,270
Time renegotiation 0.52 0.50 0 0 1 1 1 11,172
Money renegotiation 0.79 0.41 0 1 1 1 1 10,887
Selection mechanism:
Open participation 0.75 0.44 0 0 1 1 1 28,270
Private invitation 0.15 0.35 0 0 0 0 1 28,270
Direct negotiation 0.09 0.29 0 0 0 0 1 28,270
Object:
Road 0.23 0.42 0 0 0 0 1 28,270
School 0.13 0.33 0 0 0 0 1 28,270
Public building 0.05 0.22 0 0 0 0 1 28,270
Public housing 0.01 0.11 0 0 0 0 1 28,270
Art 0.04 0.19 0 0 0 0 1 28,270
Others 0.54 0.50 0 0 1 1 1 28,270
Year bid delivery:
2000 0.16 0.37 0 0 0 0 1 28,270
2001 0.21 0.40 0 0 0 0 1 28,270
2002 0.21 0.41 0 0 0 0 1 28,270
2003 0.19 0.39 0 0 0 0 1 28,270
2004 0.15 0.36 0 0 0 0 1 28,270
2005 0.08 0.27 0 0 0 0 1 28,270
Notes. Public tenders for works with starting value greater or equal 150,000 euros (2000 equivalents).
Starting value in 100,000 euros (2000 equivalents). Time renegotiation and Money renegotiation only
available for the regions of Piemonte, Valle d’Aosta, Lombardia and Trentino Alto Adige.
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Table 3.4: OLS: political longevity on the number of bidders
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean outcome: 23.41
Longevity (years) -0.175** -0.152** -0.157** -0.243***
(0.079) (0.075) (0.075) (0.079)
Population 0.164*** 0.161*** 0.160*** 0.156***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)






Term limit binding 1.646**
(0.684)
Time to next election (years) -1.224
(1.549)
Party longevity (years) -0.105
(0.102)
N. parties mayor’s coalition 0.263
(0.180)
Observations 28,270 28,270 28,270 28,270
R-squared 0.166 0.259 0.260 0.263
Province ﬁxed-eﬀects yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes
City characteristics yes yes yes yes
Auction characteristics no yes yes yes
Mayor characteristics no no yes yes
Electoral characteristics no no no yes
Notes. Estimates computed on 4,796 mayors and 3,808 cities. Number of bidders is
the number of bidding ﬁrms. Population is the resident population as of 2000, in 10
thousands. Starting value in 100,000 euros (2000 equivalents). When denoted with
“yes”, regressions additionally include Province FE (104 dummies); Year dummies
(2000-2004); City characteristics (judicial eﬃciency at year-region level; budget deﬁcit
in percentage of the revenues at year level); Auction characteristics (squared term of
the starting value, 5 object characteristics dummies, 3 selection mechanism dummies);
Mayor characteristics (gender, age, 3 education dummies, 3 previous occupation dum-
mies, a dummy for being born in the city); Electoral characteristics (number of parties
in the mayor’s coalition, squared term of the time to next election, 4 political party
dummies). Standard errors robust to clustering at the mayor level in parentheses. Sig-
niﬁcance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1%
level by ***.
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Table 3.5: OLS: political longevity on the winning rebate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean outcome: 13.21%
Longevity (years) -0.084*** -0.076*** -0.083*** -0.047*
(0.022) (0.020) (0.020) (0.028)
Population 0.049*** 0.048*** 0.047*** 0.045***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)






Term limit binding -0.251
(0.251)
Time to next election (years) 0.182
(0.252)
Party longevity (years) -0.090**
(0.040)
N. parties mayor’s coalition 0.153***
(0.050)
Observations 28,270 28,270 28,270 28,270
R-squared 0.477 0.505 0.506 0.511
Province ﬁxed-eﬀects yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes
City characteristics yes yes yes yes
Auction characteristics no yes yes yes
Mayor characteristics no no yes yes
Electoral characteristics no no no yes
Notes. Estimates computed on 4,796 mayors and 3,808 cities. Final rebate is the win-
ning rebate in percentage of the starting value. Population is the resident population
as of 2000, in 10 thousands. Starting value in 100,000 euros (2000 equivalents). When
denoted with “yes”, regressions additionally include Province FE (104 dummies);
Year dummies (2000-2004); City characteristics (judicial eﬃciency at year-region
level; budget deﬁcit in percentage of the revenues at year level); Auction characteris-
tics (squared term of the starting value, 5 object characteristics dummies, 3 selection
mechanism dummies); Mayor characteristics (gender, age, 3 education dummies, 3
previous occupation dummies, a dummy for being born in the city); Electoral char-
acteristics (number of parties in the mayor’s coalition, squared term of the time to
next election, 4 political party dummies). Standard errors robust to clustering at the
mayor level in parentheses. Signiﬁcance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the
5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
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Table 3.6: Mayors’ characteristics and behavior by election scheduling
Elected after 1993 Elected before 1993
Mean Mean p-value diﬀ.
Panel A: +/− 4 years bandwidth
Female 0.063 0.034 0.000
Age (years) 45.723 45.983 0.102
Born in the same city 0.580 0.640 0.000
Empl. high skilled 0.759 0.736 0.001
Edu. college 0.406 0.339 0.000
Previous terms in oﬃce (as mayor) 0.430 0.409 0.033
Budget deﬁcit -0.002 -0.016 0.600
Population 7,237 7,035 0.782
Judicial eﬃciency 142.654 141.426 0.263
Observations 8,182 6,865
Panel B: +/− 2 years bandwidth
Female 0.060 0.059 0.935
Age (years) 44.881 44.921 0.945
Born in the same city 0.632 0.658 0.389
Empl. high skilled 0.812 0.804 0.748
Edu. college 0.524 0.515 0.772
Previous terms in oﬃce (as mayor) 0.204 0.191 0.611
Budget deﬁcit 0.003 -0.016 0.000
Population 13,433 11,085 0.614
Judicial eﬃciency 142.829 141.790 0.828
Observations 2,285 304
Panel C: +/− 1 year bandwidth
Female 0.065 0.060 0.817
Age (years) 44.867 44.392 0.506
Born in the same city 0.630 0.628 0.946
Empl. high skilled 0.818 0.821 0.920
Edu. college 0.509 0.563 0.152
Previous terms in oﬃce (as mayor) 0.228 0.191 0.251
Budget deﬁcit -0.011 -0.017 0.269
Population 13,557 13,708 0.982
Judicial eﬃciency 145.516 144.571 0.875
Observations 1,611 199
Notes. Population is the resident population as reported in the 1991 Census. Budget deﬁcit is the
percentage budget deﬁcit over total revenues. Judicial eﬃciency is the ratio (times 100) between settled
and incoming cases, for each regional administrative court (TAR), for public works related disputes.
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Table 3.7: Fuzzy-RDD: political longevity and competition
(1) (2) (3)
ﬁrst-stage second-stage
Dependent variable: Longevity Number Winning
of bidders rebate
Mean outcome: 7.65 22.10 12.19%




Population 0.002*** 0.219*** 0.041***
(0.001) (0.013) (0.002)
Starting value -0.000 0.887*** 0.118***
(0.000) (0.143) (0.032)
Age 0.005*** 0.043 0.011
(0.001) (0.041) (0.009)
Female 0.023* -0.030 0.063
(0.012) (0.621) (0.306)
Term limit binding 1.733*** 0.850 -0.709*
(0.081) (0.895) (0.394)
Time to next election (years) -0.289*** -0.156 0.987***
(0.045) (0.557) (0.127)
Party longevity (years) 0.015*** -0.142 0.009
(0.005) (0.112) (0.019)
N. parties mayor’s coalition -0.017 0.463*** 0.348***
(0.014) (0.132) (0.052)
Observations 9,823 9,823 9,823
R-squared 0.937 0.331 0.531
F-test exc. inst. 911.1
Distance from the 1993 reform yes yes yes
Province ﬁxed-eﬀects yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes
City characteristics yes yes yes
Auction characteristics yes yes yes
Mayor characteristics yes yes yes
Electoral characteristics yes yes yes
Notes. Estimates computed on 1,766 mayors and 1,749 cities. Only mayors
elected at some point between March 27 1988 and March 27 1997. N. bidders
is the number of bidding ﬁrms. Rebate is the winning rebate in percentage of
the starting value. Population is the resident population as of 2000, in 10 thou-
sands. Starting value in 100,000 euros (2000 equivalents). Only mayors elected
at some point between March 27 1988 and March 27 1997. When denoted with
“yes”, regressions additionally include Distance from the 1993 reform (6 two-
year dummies); Province FE (104 dummies); Year dummies (2000-2004); City
characteristics (judicial eﬃciency at year-region level; budget deﬁcit in percent-
age of the revenues at year level); Auction characteristics (squared term of the
starting value, 5 object characteristics dummies, 3 selection mechanism dum-
mies); Mayor characteristics (gender, age, 3 education dummies, 3 previous
occupation dummies, a dummy for being born in the city); Electoral character-
istics (number of parties in the mayor’s coalition, squared term of the time to
next election, 4 political party dummies). Standard errors robust to clustering
at the biannual level (see Card and Lee, 2008) in parentheses. Signiﬁcance at
the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by
***.
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Table 3.8: Fuzzy-RDD: political longevity on the mechanism
(1) (2) (3) (4)
second-stage
Dependent variable: Money Time Private Winner
renegotiation renegotiation invitation from the city
Mean outcome: 0.81 0.53 0.09 0.13
Longevity (years) 0.041** 0.038* -0.009 0.003
(0.020) (0.022) (0.007) (0.003)
Population 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Starting value 0.003** -0.000 -0.005*** -0.002**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age (years) 0.001 0.002*** 0.001 0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Female -0.050*** -0.016 -0.025*** 0.034***
(0.009) (0.015) (0.007) (0.008)
Term limit binding 0.491*** 0.323*** 0.033* 0.029*
(0.019) (0.013) (0.017) (0.017)
Time to next election (years) 0.011 -0.014 -0.003 0.006
(0.009) (0.014) (0.030) (0.015)
Party longevity (years) -0.020*** -0.017*** 0.003*** 0.002
(0.005) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002)
N. parties mayor’s coalition -0.000 -0.008*** -0.001 0.001
(0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004)
Observations 3,891 3,991 9,823 9,823
R-squared 0.372 0.118 0.193 0.171
Distance from the 1993 reform yes yes yes yes
Province ﬁxed-eﬀects yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes
City characteristics yes yes yes yes
Auction characteristics yes yes yes yes
Mayor characteristics yes yes yes yes
Electoral characteristics yes yes yes yes
Notes. Only mayors elected at some point between March 27 1988 and March 27 1997. Private
invitation is a dummy for whether the auction was held with private invitation. Winner from the
city is a dummy for whether the winning ﬁrm was local. Money/time renegotiation is a dummy
for whether there was any renegotiation of the contract. % Money renegotiation is the percentage
increase in the awarding price. Population is the resident population as of 2000, in 10 thousands.
Starting value in 100,000 euros (2000 equivalents). When denoted with “yes”, regressions additionally
include Distance from the 1993 reform (6 two-year dummies); Province FE (104 dummies); Year
dummies (2000-2004); City characteristics (judicial eﬃciency at year-region level; budget deﬁcit in
percentage of the revenues at year level); Auction characteristics (squared term of the starting value, 5
object characteristics dummies, 3 selection mechanism dummies); Mayor characteristics (gender, age,
3 education dummies, 3 previous occupation dummies, a dummy for being born in the city); Electoral
characteristics (number of parties in the mayor’s coalition, squared term of the time to next election,
4 political party dummies). Standard errors robust to clustering at the biannual level (see Card and
Lee, 2008) in parentheses. Signiﬁcance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **,
and at the 1% level by ***.
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Table 3.9: Fuzzy-RDD: heterogeneous eﬀects
(1) (2)
second-stage
Dependent variable: Number Winning
of bidders rebate
Mean Outcome 23.51 12.35%














Term limit binding -1.700 -1.820***
(2.697) (0.474)
Time to next election (years) 0.936** 1.053***
(0.370) (0.180)




Distance from the 1993 reform yes yes
Province ﬁxed-eﬀects yes yes
Year dummies yes yes
Authority characteristics yes yes
Auction characteristics yes yes
Chief characteristics yes yes
Electoral characteristics yes yes
Notes. Estimates computed on 1,841 chiefs and 1,584 author-
ities. Only chiefs elected at some point between March 27
1988 and March 27 1997. N. bidders is the number of bidding
ﬁrms. Rebate is the winning rebate in percentage of the start-
ing value. Province is a dummy for whether the contracting
authority is a province rather than a municipality. Population
is the resident population as of 2000, in 10 thousands. Start-
ing value in 100,000 euros (2000 equivalents). When denoted
with “yes”, regressions additionally include Distance from the
1993 reform (6 two-year dummies); Province FE (104 dum-
mies); Year dummies (2000-2004); Authority characteristics
(judicial eﬃciency at year-region level); Auction characteris-
tics (squared term of the starting value, 5 object characteristics
dummies, 3 selection mechanism dummies); Chief characteris-
tics (gender, age, 3 education dummies, 3 previous occupation
dummies); Electoral characteristics (squared term of the time
to next election, 4 political party dummies). Standard errors
robust to clustering at the biannual level (see Card and Lee,
2008) in parentheses. Signiﬁcance at the 10% level is repre-
sented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by
***.
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Figure 3.1: The awarding mechanism
R (Rebates)￿
min￿ R￿ Max￿ R￿
Trimming of the Tails￿
         (-10 %)￿
Win￿ R￿ R￿ Exc￿ R￿
Anomaly Threshold￿




Trimming of the Tails￿
         (+10 %)￿
T￿







Notes. TL stands for the term limit being binding. Shadow lines mean potential following
terms.
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year in office
2nd term & term−limit 1st term
Notes. N. bidders is the number of bidding ﬁrms. Final rebate is the winning rebate in percentage of the starting
value.





































































6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5
year in office
2nd term & no term−limit 1st term
Notes. N. bidders is the number of bidding ﬁrms. Final rebate is the winning rebate in percentage of the starting
value.
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date of termination
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Notes. In blue: the 1993 reform. In red: the period over which we have auction data.




















01jan1992 01jan1993 01jan1994 01jan1995
date of termination
natural termination early resignation
early resignation & reelection
Notes. In blue: the 1993 reform. Early resignation before the end of the fourth year in oﬃce because of: mayor’s
resignation, vote of no conﬁdence by 50% of either the council or the executive committee.
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